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A b s t r a c t 
This thesis investigates the way that moral and aesthetic concerns about the 
relationship between fiction and reality are manifested in the work of particular novelists 
writing at different periods in the nineteenth century. Chapter One examines an early-
century subgenre of the novel that features deluded female readers who fail to 
differentiate between fantasy and reality, and who consequently attempt to live their lives 
according to foolish precepts learned from novels. The second chapter deals with the 
realist aesthetic of W. M. Thackeray, focusing on the techniques by which his fiction 
marks its own relationship both to less realistic fiction and to reality itself. The final 
chapter discusses Oscar Wilde ' s critical stance that art is meaningful and intellectually 
satisfying, while reality and realism are aesthetically worthless: it then goes on to explore 
how these ideas play out in his novel. The Picture of Dorian Gray. 
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
"What is your opinion of novels? A n ' t they all love and nonsense and the 
most impossible lies possible." 
"They are fictions, certainly," said he. 
"Surely. Sir," exclaimed I, "you do not mean to call them fictions?" 
"Why, no , " replied he, "not absolute fictions." 
"But ," cried the big lady, "you don ' t pretend to call them true." 
"Why, no , " said he, "not absolutely true." 
-Eaton Stannard Barrett, The Heroine 
In her book Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction, 
Patricia Waugh writes, "Metafiction is a term given to fictional writing which self­
consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose 
questions about the relationship between fiction and reality" (2). By definition, then, 
metafiction—fiction about fiction—is concerned with the relationship between fiction 
and reality: any consciousness of fictionality necessarily implies a corresponding 
awareness of an external reality and of some form of interaction between the two spheres. 
A number of novels written over the course of the nineteenth century address the fiction-
reality relationship, with varying degrees of the self-consciousness required for a work to 
qualify as "metafiction" in the strict sense, and their treatments of this subject reflect 
people 's views, both moral and literary-critical, of the nature, aims, and influence of 
fiction. 
The moral angle of the debate surrounding novels as an art form and a social force 
had to do with the understanding of fiction as a type of untruth that had the potential to 
corrupt readers ' understandings of reality. Compared to more traditional versified or epic 
modes of fiction, the novel, with its psychologically complex characters, detailed 
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descriptions of social interaction, and logical narrative progression, had an unprecedented 
potential for realism. In the words of an anonymous writer in 1853, "The flimsiest 
modern novel that ever young lady devoured, or critic sneered at, is infinitely superior in 
artistic arrangement and skilful continuity of plot to even the most readable of ancient 
fictions" ("The Progress of Fiction as an Art" 75). Furthermore, novels were proliferating 
wildly. Writing in 1857, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen remarks that "Upwards of a million 
of the cheap shilling volumes which ornament railway book-stalls are disposed of 
annually, and the effect of these publications on the whole mind of the community can 
hardly be exaggerated" (302). Ten years later, an anonymous critic suggests that "The 
popular passion for reading and for writing novels is one of the most important 
intellectual features of the age" ("Novel-Reading" 593), and Richard Holt Button 
concurs, asserting in 1869 that the novel has "attained in England a kind of 'empire , ' 
which enables it to overshadow for the t ime almost every other kind of non-political 
literature" (649). As a result of the ubiquity of novels and novel reading, it was a 
common fear, especially early in the century, that impressionable readers would 
misconstrue the fictions contained in these novels as fact, imbibing fanciful notions that 
these readers would then attempt to apply to their own lives. 
As concerns about the (im)morality of fiction gradually abated over the course of 
the century, discussion about the aesthetic value of realistic versus imaginative fiction 
intensified. Debate on the question culminated towards the end of the century in the 
opposing viewpoints of Henry James and Oscar Wilde, the former arguing that the air of 
reality is "the supreme virtue of a novel—the merit on which all its other merits .. . 
helplessly and submissively depend" ("The Art of Fiction" 33), and the latter having one 
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of his characters snort derisively that he hates "vulgar realism in literature" and that "The 
man who could call a spade a spade should be compelled to use one" (The Picture of 
Dorian Gray 142). The only point that James and Wilde agree upon is that questions of 
art and questions of morality are quite separate affairs and must not be confused. 1 
In the following pages, I examine three different approaches that nineteenth-
century novelists use to articulate moral and aesthetic arguments about the relationship 
between truth and fiction. Though attempts to impose distinct chronological divisions 
upon continuous streams of thought are always somewhat arbitrary, these approaches can 
be loosely associated with particular texts produced in the early, middle, and late periods 
of the century, respectively, and ray thesis is accordingly divided into three sections. 
In the first section. 1 discuss a particular subgenre of the novel that emerged in the 
latter part of the eighteenth century and remained common during the early years of the 
nineteenth. Novels of this type tell the stories of deluded readers, usually female, who 
confuse fantasy and reality and foolishly attempt to live their lives according to precepts 
based on fictional conventions. The specific examples that I examine include Tabitha 
Oilman Tenney 's Female Quixotism (1801). Charlotte Dacre ' s The Confessions of the 
Nun of St. Omer (1805), Sarah Green 's Romance Readers and Romance Writers: A 
Satirical Novel (1810), Eaton Stannard Barret t 's The Heroine. Or Adventures of 
Cherubina (1813). and Jane Austen 's Northanger Abbey (1818). 
The formulaic story of the deluded or "quixotic" reader that is employed by each 
of these novels inevitably implies a critique of the conventions of romantic and 
sentimental fiction, ridiculing these conventions as absurdly unrealistic. However, 
substantial variations from novel to novel in the delivery of the critique suggest different 
1
 See James, "The Art of Fiction" (42-43) and Wilde, preface to Dorian Gray (vii). 
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motives behind it. Tenney. Dacre, and Green imbue their works with a spirit of serious 
didacticism that conveys a genuine concern about the dangers that may result from a 
reader 's failure to mark the distinction between reality and fantasy; their critical gaze 
falls, not on their own novels, but on the potential dangers of misreading a different— 
more romantic or morally questionable—kind of fiction. Their concern with the 
relationship between truth and fiction pertains more to questions of morality than to those 
of literary artistry, reflecting their belief in the grave consequences facing the reader who 
confuses the two. The conclusions that are drawn regarding the other texts discussed 
within the novels are not overtly related to the novels themselves. 
Barrett and Austen, on the other hand, approach the deluded-reader plot from a 
slightly different angle. Their novels are self-conscious—and thus, explicitly 
metafictional—in a way that the more didactic ones are not, and they clearly imply a 
relationship between the novels at hand and the ones that are parodied within them. By 
implicating themselves in their discussion of the truth-fiction dichotomy, and by 
redeeming their quixotic readers essentially unscathed at the end of the story. The 
Heroine and North anger Abbey present versions of the quixote narrative that are less 
morally charged than driven by a literary-critical impulse. Though adhering closely to the 
same standard plot as the didactic works, their thematic effect is closer to the sort of self-
interrogation that is typical of the mid-century novels discussed below. With its realistic 
style. Nonhanger Abbey in particular juxtaposes an alternative literary aesthetic against 
the gothic romantic mode that it gently parodies. 
The second section of m y thesis deals with the work of one prominent mid-
nineteenth century realist. William Makepeace Thackeray, focusing primarily on the 
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novels Vanity Fair (1848) and The History ofPendennis (1850). While the didactic 
female quixote novels in the first chapter focus their critical gaze on the romances and 
sentimental novels that lead their heroines astray, Thackeray 's writings comment on the 
degree of realism that is actually attainable in the realistic genre to which they themselves 
belong. Having rejected the improbable excesses of romantic fiction in favour of what 
George Levine refers to as "the high Victorian ideal of Truth or Sincerity" (9), Thackeray 
is faced with the problem of reconciling a plausible narrative with the unavoidable 
limitations of textuality and the conventions and assumptions already inherent in the 
novelistic form. He employs two basic strategies in order to emphasize the relative 
realism of his own work, and both involve a high degree of textual self-consciousness. 
The first is to point out the places in which his novels deviate from improbable fictional 
conventions to comply more closely with natural human characteristics or a more 
believable progression of events. The second is to open a window onto the contrived 
nature of his own texts and, where they adhere to the dictates of fictional conventions or 
narrative constraints, to broadcast an awareness of the fact. In this way, he attempts to 
compensate for a deficiency of plausibility within the necessarily artificial narrative 
structure by acknowledging a truth about that narrative structure. 
Both of these strategies draw the reader 's attention to the divergence between 
fiction and reality, but, unlike in the novels discussed in chapter one, the purpose of doing 
so is not to deter the reader from applying fictional standards to her lived reality. On the 
contrary, it is made clear throughout Thackeray 's works that readers approach the real 
world and the world of fiction with significantly different expectations, based on two 
separate and inconsistent value systems. One of his primary purposes is to question this 
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double standard and readers ' unthinking acceptance of blatantly unrealistic plot and 
character conventions. As in the earlier didactic texts, the reader is thus encouraged to 
recognize a distinction between reality and fictional conventions; this t ime, however, the 
author 's goal is not to instill improved moral direction, but to spark the development of 
more critical reading habits and an exacting realist aesthetic standard. 
The novels discussed in the first two sections of this thesis treat the subject of 
fiction and reality as though there is a clear distinction between the two; they represent 
reality as an entity that exists as an absolute unto itself, in unequivocal opposition to the 
artifice contained in novels. They also valorize reality as the standard by which fiction 
should be measured, in both moral and aesthetic terms, in the final section, however, I 
discuss a third approach to understanding the relationship between fiction and reality that 
effectively destabilizes the hitherto accepted fiction-reality dichotomy, and that 
furthermore values fiction as being more meaningful than reality. This approach 
corresponds most closely to what some modern critics understand by the term 
"metafiction," in that it explores "the possible fictionality of the world outside the 
fictional text" (Waugh 2). 
In the theories and fiction of Oscar Wilde, which provide the focus for the third 
chapter, the traditional understanding of fiction as an imperfect reflection of reality is 
completely turned on its head. In contrast to works that assert, firstly, that truth and 
fiction are distinct entities and. secondly, that the value of fiction is proportionate to the 
degree of its resemblance to reality, Wilde 's critical writings such as "The Decay of 
Lying" (1891) and "The Critic as Artist" (1891) famously suggest that life should seek to 
imitate art. Fiction is thus acknowledged to be and valorized as the guiding principle of 
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reality, rather than vice versa—a stance that represents a complete about-face from the 
early-century quixote novels ' fervent backlash against the same idea. Many of the 
arguments found in Wilde's critical writings also surface in his gothic-fantastic novel, 
The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), and their treatment in this context appears, 
perplexingly, to both contradict and corroborate Wilde ' s accepted views on the nature of 
truth and fiction. 
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I I . Fict ion a n d the F e m a l e Quixo te 
What stuff are you reading here? W h y you might as well read Mother 
Bunch 's Fairy Tales, or a Defence of Witchcraft. 
-Sarah Green, Romance Readers and Romance Writers 
The "quixote nove l" of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is a 
particular manifestation of novelistic concern with the relationship between reality and 
fiction, anchoring both plot and theme in the imagined consequences of a person 's absurd 
and literal confusion between fact and fantasy. Beginning in 1752 with Charlotte 
Lennox ' s The Female Quixote and concluding with Sarah Green 's Scotch Novel Reading 
in 1824, there was an explosion of novels that focused on the miseducation of the central 
character, almost always a young girl, through her overly credulous reading of romances 
or sentimental novels. Some instances of the genre employ the trope of the deluded 
female reader in order to critique the absurd excesses of romance from a primarily 
aesthetic standpoint, but many others embody a sincere warning against mistaking 
romantic fiction for a roadmap to the ways of the world. 
While the female quixote genre is fiction's most explicit and sustained 
contribution to the discussion about the potential danger to readers of confusing fact and 
fantasy, social concerns about the strong influence and possible negative effects of 
reading fiction, along with the conviction that women are particularly susceptible to such 
effects, were common throughout the nineteenth century. It is evident that novels were 
one of the most readily accessible (and accessed) sources of information during this 
period, and the consequent assumption that they should exert some influence over their 
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readers is only natural. One anonymous writer in 1867 compares the effects of novel 
reading to the effects of any kind of enveloping education, implying that the degree of 
one 's exposure to a source of information has more bearing on its capacity to influence 
than does its status as a fictional or non-fictional work. According to this critic, "Novel-
reading, like a classical or scientific education, must have some definite effect upon the 
age that imbues itself in it . . . . The whole imagination of younger men and women is every 
day immersed in a vapour-bath of either a useless or useful kind, and it is idle to suppose 
that nothing on earth will come of it. either for good or evil" ("Novel-Reading" 593). The 
relatively realistic style of the novel, as compared to its forerunners in the realm of 
fiction, was also a major factor in its perception as an influential genre. With its 
psychologically complex characters, detailed descriptions of social interaction, and 
logical narrative progression, the novel ' s brand of verbal photography gives earlier 
versified and epic modes of fiction the air of vague, impressionist painting. 
The belief that readers would accept information gleaned from fiction as a 
standard by which to govern their own conduct hinges on two assumptions: firstly, that 
people pattern their own beliefs and behaviour after the beliefs and behaviour that they 
observe in others, and secondly, that people respond similarly to events and characters 
whether they be real or fictional. Both of these convictions are held as a given by various 
critics writing at different points in the nineteenth century. Hugh Murray, for instance, 
asserts in 1805 that "The slightest observation may be sufficient to convince us. that man 
is, in many respects, an imitative being. His character, undoubtedly, is very much formed 
after that of those with whom he becomes acquainted, either by reading, or by the 
intercourse of life" (Murray 18). In Vernon Lee's much later fictional and critical text "A 
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Dialogue on Novels" (1885), the character of Baldwin, whose role as the central literary 
philosopher of the piece allows us to identify his beliefs as those of the author, expounds 
on the notion that, once consigned to memory, impressions derived from reading are 
virtually indistinguishable from those formed in real life. He argues that "a good third of 
what we take to be instinctive knowledge, or knowledge vaguely acquired from personal 
experience, is really obtained from the novels which we or our friends have read" (Lee 
390). Furthermore, Lee 's Baldwin suggests that the novel is capable not only of 
strengthening and reinscribing human tendencies as they already exist in real life, but also 
of introducing new tendencies. The novel, he argues, "has developed in us ... a number 
and variety of moral notes which did not exist in the gamut of our fathers" (389); he goes 
on to say that "the modern human being has been largely fashioned, in all his more 
delicate peculiarities, by those who have written about him; and most of all, therefore, by 
the novelist" (390). 
Many critics throughout the century also predicated their belief in the novel ' s 
influence on the fact that it is a truly democratic form of literature, circulated among 
people of all classes, ages, and levels of education. Anthony Troll ope draws attention to 
the ubiquity of novel reading among all echelons of society when he writes in 1870 that 
"We have become a novel-reading people. Novels are in the hands of us all; from the 
Prime Minister down to the last-appointed scullery-maid" ("On English Prose Fiction" 
108). Concern about the novel ' s accessibility to undiscerning consumers of information is 
evident in the way that critics tend to qualify their assertions about the novel ' s influence 
over its readers by suggesting that the major novel-reading demographic consists of 
individuals who arc young, inexperienced, uneducated, female, or otherwise intellectually 
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deficient, and therefore more susceptible to believing everything they read. Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen, for example, claims in an 1857 article that, unlike men of the world, 
"the poor and uneducated take such words in their natural and undiluted strength" (308). 
Particularly in the early part of the century, women are repeatedly identified as 
one of the groups whose grasp of reality is especially vulnerable to assault by foolish 
notions derived from reading fiction. Practical Education, an education manual produced 
in 1798 by Maria Edgeworth and Richard Lovell Edgeworth, warns: 
With respect to sentimental stories, and books of mere entertainment, we must 
remark, that they should be sparingly used, especially in the education of gir ls . . . 
W e know, from common experience, the effects which are produced upon the 
female mind by immoderate novel-reading. To those who acquire this taste every 
object becomes disgusting which is not in an attitude for poetic painting; a species 
of moral picturesque is sought for in every scene of life, and this is not always 
compatible with sound sense, or with simple reality.. . . The difference between 
reality and fiction is so great, that those who copy from any thing but nature are 
continually disposed to make mistakes in their conduct, which appear ludicrous to 
the impartial spectator. (332-33) 
The fact that these comments read like a roadmap to the generic female quixote narrative 
attests to the strong relationship that existed between this literary paradigm and genuine 
social concerns about women ' s reading. 
Ironically, it could be argued that the repetition of the trope of the female quixote 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century may have contributed to the construction of 
the figure of the deluded female reader in the popular understanding—-effectively 
transforming a fantastic " type" into a generally acknowledged truth about readers, and 
female readers in particular. This idea is supported by twentieth-century critic Walter J. 
Ong ' s observation that an author of fiction will typically "fictionalize in his imagination 
an audience he has learned to know not from daily life but from earlier writers who were 
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fictionalizing in their imaginations audiences they had learned to know in still earlier 
writers, and so on back to the dawn of written narrative" (11). Since, as John Tinnon 
Taylor observes. "Few young women have ever been beset by such extravagant fancies as 
were generously ascribed to the girls w ho patronized the eighteenth-century circulating 
libraries" (69), it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the anxiety-inducing 
"specter of the novel-reading automaton" (Warner 142) frequently evoked in non-
fictional tracts by critics and moralists may have gained some credibility thanks to the 
repetitive incarnation of the female quixote in fictional texts. In other words , the widely 
accepted view of real female readers as unable to distinguish between fiction and reality 
may owe something to the apparent mutual corroboration offered by numerous copies of 
a fictional quixotic prototype. 
The purpose of the literary criticism that occurs in the didactic female quixote 
novel is outward-looking: it questions the relationship to reality of fiction other than the 
text at hand. Indeed, the apparent lack of textual self-consciousness in some of these 
novels is striking, considering that their central precept is the necessity to recognize the 
fictionality of fiction. Self-interrogation is not on their agenda, however: these works 
seek specifically to convince the reader that other types of fiction—variously, romances. 
~ A number of nineteenth-century writers offer definitions of the distinction between the novel and the 
romance; in the preface to The House of the Seven Gables, for example, Nathaniel Hawthorne famously 
asserts that, "When a writer calls his work a Romance, it need hardly be observed that he wishes to claim a 
certain latitude, both as to its fashion and material, which he would not have felt himself entitled to assume, 
had he professed to be writing a Novel. The latter form of composition is presumed to aim at a very minute 
fidelity, not merely to the possible, but to the probable and ordinary course of man's experience" (xi). 
Similarly, an anonymous 1841 review in The Athenaeum explains that "the Novel, while it strives to arrest 
our attention by exciting our sympathy and surprise, appeals to the observant and reasoning faculties 
also;—the Romance, on the contrary, addresses itself to the imagination alone, and, most often, requires for 
its full enjoyment an absolute torpor of both observation and reason" (Rev. of Charles Chesterfield; or, the 
Adventurers of a Youth of Genius 369). For her part, Jane Austen, novelist extraordinaire, writes in an 1816 
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sentimental novels, or the scandalous writings of free-thinking novelists-—are unrealistic, 
and that it is potentially harmful to perceive them as sources of information about the 
world. In the following section, I will examine the tactics employed to this end in Tabitha 
Oilman Tenney 's Female Quixotism (1801), Charlotte Dacre 's The Confessions of the 
Nun of St. Omer (1805), and Sarah Green 's Romance Readers and Romance Writers: A 
Satirical Novel (1810). 
These "didactic female quixote novels," as I have labelled them for the purposes 
of this discussion, are characterized by their relatively ungentle treatment of the quixotic 
heroine, who inevitably recognizes the error of her ways when it is already too late to 
escape their tragic consequences. Female Quixotism has been referred to as the first 
American burlesque novel (Shepperson 114), and it demonstrates that the popularity of 
the female quixote theme was not restricted to Britain alone. Tenney ' s book tells the 
story of Dorcas Sheldon, a wealthy girl of middling attractions whose compulsive reading 
of sentimental novels leads her to form exalted and unrealizable ideas about love. Dorcas, 
who romantically re-christens herself "Dorcasina," foolishly rejects two eminently 
suitable suitors whose courtship strategies are too mundane for her taste. Throughout the 
story, she is repeatedly rescued from the mocking advances of fortune-hunters, only to 
end up old, ugly, and alone. Though the tone of Tenney 's writing is humorous , the barbed 
jokes are almost always made at Dorcasina 's expense; other characters in the novel 
respond to her with a mixture of ridicule and disgust—or contempt-tinged pity at bes t— 
and the reader is encouraged to do the same. 
letter to James Stam'er Clarke: "1 could not sit seriously down to write a serious romance under any other 
motive than to save my life; and if it were indispensable for me to keep it up and never relax into laughing 
at myself or other people, I am sure 1 should be hung before 1 had finished the first chapter" (384). 
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In contrast to Female Quixotism and the other novels discussed in this chapter, 
The Confessions of the Nun of St. Omer is utterly humourless in its approach to punishing 
its heroine for her ready acceptance of precepts contained in ill-chosen fiction. As the 
title suggests, the narrative is conveyed in the form of a confessional letter written by the 
heroine, Cazire, now a nun in the convent of St. Omer. The letter is addressed to her 
bastard son. The epistolary frame, in which Cazire immediately begins to lament the 
foolish course that has brought affairs to their present miserable state, prepares the reader 
from the outset to perceive Cazire 's unwise reading as a nefarious force in her life. 
Despite the pleas of her valiant suitor. St. Elmer, Cazire indulges her insatiable appetite 
for romances and, even more damagingly, for novels that question absolute moral truths 
and advocate the consummation of love outside the bounds of marriage. This course of 
reading leads to her seduction by the unscrupulous free-thinker, Lindorf. Following her 
seduction. Cazire attempts to resist the passions that have been planted in her mind: she 
marries the forgiving St. Elmer but then allows herself to be seduced by another villain. 
Fribourg. who subsequently kills St. Elmer in a duel before committ ing suicide. 
Confessions is an example of a book that appears to lack any awareness that it 
subscribes to some of the very conventions that it writes against, and this point is 
underscored by later criticism of Dacre ' s own fiction (which she wrote under the nom de 
plume "Rosa Matilda"). An anonymous critic in 1870 writes that "If it has been [a girl 's] 
particular misfortune to have read only one or two of the Rosa-Matilda novels, she may 
very probably have a notion that the proper thing for her lover to do, in proposing to her, 
is to go down on his knees, place his hand on his heart, and swear ridiculous vows" ("The 
Uses of Fiction" 7). Anthony Trollope, demonstrating that he, at least, has not fallen 
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victim to the "dangerous, though charming power" (Confessions 62) that Dacre 
unselfconsciously attributes to overly romantic fiction, likewise makes reference to "the 
Rosa Mati lda school of fiction, than which the desire to have something to read has 
produced nothing in literature more vapid or more mean" ("Novel-Reading" 118). 
Sarah Green, the last of the didactic quixote novelists whom we will examine, has 
been described by Archibald Shepperson as "by far the most vindictive of the anti-liberal 
novelists" (127). Her Romance Readers and Romance Writers is in some ways a cross 
between Tenney ' s and Dacre ' s works: it subjects its romance-reading heroine, Margaret 
(who prefers to be known as Margaritta), to the same kind of mockery that is found in 
Female Quixotism, while leading her along the path to corruption and seduction that is 
followed by Cazire in Confessions. This novel also presents us with a second reader, the 
aristocratic Isabella, whose preferred destructive reading material consists of unprincipled 
French and German works . Both girls meet with similar unfortunate ends, clearly 
underscoring Green 's point about the inevitability of the outcome that she associates with 
unwise reading. Margaret ' s romantic notions lead her to blunder her way through a series 
of blackly comic misadventures until, having been introduced to Isabella's brand of 
literary poison, she ultimately becomes pregnant by a young nobleman who seduces and 
abandons her largely out of contempt for her romance-induced foolishness. Isabella, too, 
ends up seduced and abandoned. Throughout the novel. Margaret is constantly compared 
to her sister, Mary, whose general superiority is carefully associated with her own 
laudable reading habits. 
Female quixote novels are often uninventive in selecting specific delusions to 
inflict on their respective heroines, and the same types of incidents and misapprehensions 
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are repeated across many examples of the genre. Common follies include the heroine 's 
belief that the truth of her birth has been concealed from her: her mistaking of a lowborn 
servant, often Irish, for a nobleman in disguise: and her exploration of some mysterious 
(or absurdly mundane) edifice in the hopes of uncovering its dark, Gothic, and—to the 
knowing reader—palpably nonexistent secrets. Female Quixotism and Romance Readers 
are rife with such conventions; however, it is not m y purpose to enumerate all the 
instances of delusional behaviour that occur in the plots of these particular novels. 
Rather, I intend to examine the broader thematic elements that relate more literally to the 
lessons that the authors of these books intend for their readers to take away with them, 
and to the opinions of moralists and literary critics of the day. These books are addressed 
to the female quixote presumed to lurk in the heart of every young girl. Their direct 
concern is not that novel readers routinely fancy themselves to be displaced heiresses 
with outrageously embellished names, but that their reading may cause them to lose sight 
of the everyday truths that society endorses. 
The most important of these truths, because of their central ity to w o m e n ' s lives, 
are those pertaining to love, marriage, and the preservation of virtue. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, perhaps the most commonly observed and criticized feature of fiction 
is its singular preoccupation with love. On the ubiquity of the subject, an 1856 article 
entitled "On the Treatment of Love in Novels'" comments that "It is the only ingredient 
that enters into every dish. In the composition of the novel it answers to the garlic of the 
Spanish cuisine—whatever else may vary the flavour, love is indispensable" (269). 
Writing in 1870. Anthony Trollope offers a similar assessment of the composition of 
novels, arguing that "love stories are their mainstay and the staff of their existence. They 
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not only contain love stories, but they are written for the sake of the love stories. They 
have other attractions, and deal with every phase of life; but the other attractions hang 
round and depend on the love story as the planets depend upon the sun" ("On English 
Prose Fiction" 108). In a later article, Trollope recognizes the impact that the novel ' s 
dealings with love had on its reception as a genre, saying, "No doubt that fear which did 
exist as to novels came from the idea that this matter of love would be treated in an 
inflammatory and unwholesome manner" ("Novel Reading" 128). This assertion is 
supported by much evidence from the earlier period to which he alludes. 
Defending the novel in 1802. for example. James Sands bewails the way that 
novelists "are charged with representing Love as uncontroulable. omnipotent, and 
everlasting, to the incalculable detriment of society" (xviii). The writers w ho make the 
accusations to which Sands is alluding are emphatic in their explanations of why such 
depictions of love are so detrimental, and their arguments take two general forms. The 
more common of these contentions is that reading about love endangers w o m e n ' s virtue 
by making them susceptible to seduction. In her 1798 education manual. The Boarding 
School, Hannah Webster Foster accordingly writes, "Novels are the favourite, and the 
most dangerous kind of reading, now adopted by the generality of young ladies. 1 say 
dangerous, because the influence, which, with very few exceptions, they must have on 
the passions of youth, bears an unfavourable aspect on their purity and vir tue" (280). 
Hannah More ' s Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education similarly claims 
that novels "take off wholesome restraints, diminish sober mindedness . impair the 
general powers of resistance, and at best feed habits of improper indulgence, and nourish 
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a vain and visionary indolence, which lays the mind open to error and the heart to 
seduction" (216). 
The second argument against the suitability of love stories for young, female 
readers is that such stories foster false expectations of the world and lead girls to feel 
dissatisfied with their actual lots in life. Anna Laetitia Aiken Barbauld writes in 1810: 
Love is a passion particularly exaggerated in novels. It forms the chief interest of, 
by far, the greater part of them. In order to increase this interest, a false idea is 
given of the importance of the passion. It occupies the serious hours of life; events 
all hinge upon it: every thing gives way to its influence, and no length of time 
wears it out. When a young lady, having imbibed these notions, comes into the 
world, she finds that this formidable passion acts a very subordinate part on the 
grand theatre of the world. . . . and is often little consulted even in choosing a 
partner for life. (182-83) 
Florence Nightingale offers a complete and unusual reversal of this idea in her mid-
century tirade against the injustice of women ' s position in society. Cassandra. She 
suggests that the importance attributed to passionate love in fiction is not spurious, but 
utterly in keeping with the natural leanings of the human spirit. The burden of absurdity, 
she argues, lies rather in the system by which real-world marriages are typically 
contracted: 
. . .[I]n a few rare, very rare, cases, such as circumstances, always provided in 
novels, but seldom to be met with in real life, present—whether the accident of 
parents ' neglect, or of parents ' unusual skill and wisdom, or of having no parents 
at all, which is generally the case in novels—or marrying out of the person 's rank 
of life, by which the usual restraints are removed, and there is room and play left 
for attraction—or extraordinary events, isolation, misfortunes, which many wish 
for. even though their imaginations be not tainted by romance-reading: such 
alternatives as these give food and space for the development of character and 
mutual sympathies. (1596) 
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Nightingale 's pointed assertion that a person 's imagination need not be "tainted by 
romance-reading" in order to desire the improbable events typical in novels implies that 
fictional love plots reflect just and innate female longings that are unnaturally suppressed 
by society. She thus rebuts the charge that novels are blameable for inspiring women with 
dreams of impossible events, placing the guilt instead with the tyrannical social system 
that has senselessly reduced the true love match to an almost entirely fictional 
phenomenon. The didactic quixote novels, however, side resoundingly with the 
conservative critics and moralists on this issue. As indicated in the brief synopses above, 
all three of the novels in question identify the truly destructive aspects of novel reading 
with the way that novels depict love. 
Throughout most of British history, the majority of marriages—particularly 
among the middle and upper classes—were based chiefly on pragmatic factors, with 
virtually no importance given to love or personal concerns. According to Lawrence 
Stone, however, the eighteenth century brought an important shift "from giving priority 
to economic and social considerations to giving equal or more weight to solidly based 
and well-tried mutual affection," leading to the new standard of the companionate 
marriage (273). Wendy Jones defines companionate love as being in many ways akin to 
friendship, involving mutual esteem and affection and lacking the element of sexual 
desire (27). Later in the eighteenth century, the ideal of companionate love gave way in 
turn to that of sentimental love: a synthesis of romantic and companionate love in which 
"The reasonable criteria of companionate love ... inspire the passionate affect of 
romantic or physical love" (Jones 28). Thus, the standard view was that men should 
choose their brides "for such enduring companionate qualities as chastity, sobriety, 
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industry, frugality, cleanliness, knowledge of domestic affairs, good temper and beau ty— 
in that order" (Stone 287). Jones argues that socio-economic factors contributed greatly 
to the rise of this brand of marriage for love, which was a useful tool for justifying the 
intermingling of newly moneyed classes with old, titled families. As she puts it, "the 
purely utilitarian marriage of wealth and status was unacceptable, at least in theory, to 
elites of both groups. Love emerged as the only acceptable motive for marriages across 
class boundar ies" (19-20). 
Despite this shift, society continued to frown upon purely romantic and 
impractical love, along with its attendant specter of lust, as a basis for marriage. Though 
it had long been familiar as a prominent literary phenomenon, romantic love and its 
potentially anarchic consequences simply had no place in the real world. While a degree 
of rationally motivated, sentimental love was useful in facilitating the business of 
awkward interclass marriages, the rampant passions of lust and romantic love could have 
the patently undesirable result of eliminating class concerns altogether as a criterion for 
marriage (Jones 23). Lawrence Stone describes the characteristics of this dangerous, 
spontaneous, and anti-rational form of love as follows: 
The key elements of the romantic love complex are the following: the notion that 
there is only one person in the world with whom one can fully unite at all levels; 
the personality of that person is so idealized that the normal faults and follies of 
human nature disappear from view: love is often like a thunderbolt and strikes at 
first sight; love is the most important thing in the world, to which all other 
considerations, particularly material ones, should be sacrificed; and lastly, the 
giving of full rein to personal emotions is admirable, no matter how exaggerated 
and absurd the resulting conduct may appear to others. (282) 
Obviously, an emotional ideal that places so much emphasis on individualism and 
personal desires was not conducive to the social and economic interests of families or 
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classes, and this was ample reason to keep romantic love confined to the realm of fiction. 
It is this motive that largely informs the didactic strategy of the female quixote novels. 
The chief danger attributed to the fiction of romantic love—and, by extension, to 
the writings that propagate the notion—is its power to render young women susceptible 
to seduction. Indeed, Lawrence Stone reports that "Both Dr. Johnson and Mary 
Wollstonecraft regarded [lust and romantic love] as the same thing, romantic love being 
no more than a purely artificial emotion invented by novelists and adopted by men as a 
cover for sexual desire' ' (284). In Dacre ' s Confessions of the Nun of St. Omer and 
Green 's Romance Readers and Romance Writers, the romantic notions imbibed by the 
heroines serve just this purpose, bringing them to eventual ruin; in Tenney 's Female 
Quixotism, the same sordid fate is averted only through the repeated intercession of 
Dorcasina 's friends and family. 
Towards the beginning of Female Quixotism, Tenney firmly establishes her 
position on the subject of romantic love when she has her narrator refer to "the airy 
delusions and visionary dreams of love and raptures, darts, fire and flames, with which 
the indiscreet writers of that fascinating kind of books, denominated Novels , fill the 
heads of artless young girls, to their great injury, and sometimes to their utter ruin" (4-5). 
This passage emphatically conveys three points; that romantic love is a strictly fantastic 
phenomenon, consisting merely of "airy delusions" and "visionary dreams"; that novels 
are unquestionably at fault for unleashing this force on the imaginations of innocent 
young women; and that its effects are at best injurious and at worst utterly ruinous. 
Tenney thus paraphrases the view accepted among her contemporary critics and moralists 
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and introduces the opposition between truth and fiction that underpins the rest of the 
narrative. 
At one point, Dorcasina explicitly outlines the tenets of her novel-inspired 
philosophy of love, declaring, "love must be sudden, ardent, violent, and mutual. Matches 
made upon this foundation can alone be productive of lasting felicity" (204). Elsewhere, 
she pledges that she will never "renounce m y darling, my favourite ideas of everlasting 
love and eternal constancy, upon which I build all my hopes of worldly happiness ." 
saying that she "could almost as easily renounce my religion" (77). All of these 
statements echo Stone 's description, quoted above, of the typical characteristics of 
romantic love. Throughout Female Quixotism, love acts as the guiding principle and 
consuming obsession of Dorcasina"s existence—a false idol, as her own allusion to 
religion suggests. She is, in effect, in love with love itself. Her assertions about the nature 
of love and her expectations about the role it will play in her happiness are infused with a 
spirit of dramatic irony that is designed to inspire the reader with a cynical attitude 
towards the romantic ideal espoused by the ridiculous Dorcasina. 
Dorcasina's single-minded preoccupation with love makes her vulnerable to the 
predatory advances of several unscrupulous men. As the heiress to a considerable fortune, 
she presents an alluring target for suitors willing to take advantage of her foolish 
predilections, despite being "a middling kind of person" (5) in the way of physical 
appeal. In one instance, a lower-class Irishman named Patrick O 'Connor determines to 
act out Dorcasina's absurd courtship fantasies in order to gain her heart and her money. 
Tenney thus addresses the anxiety that the precepts of romantic love can lead to 
inappropriate alliances between classes. Though O 'Connor ' s plot, and those of 
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Dorcasina 's other false suitors, are foiled through the agency of her friends, the idea that 
romantic delusion provides a vehicle for exploitation is constantly present throughout the 
novel. 
Tenney also provides a counterpoint to Dorcasina 's treasured ideal of love by 
endorsing more pragmatic and realistic motives for marriage. At the beginning of the 
novel. Dorcasina and her father are visited by Lysander, a respectable and most eligible 
family friend. Dorcasina, however, is disappointed when, contrary to the process 
described in her treasured novels, Lysander does not fall instantly in love with her. The 
narrator explains, "Her mind being so warped by the false and romantic ideas of love, 
which she had imbibed from her favourite authors, she never considered that the purest 
and most lasting affection is founded upon esteem and the amiable qualities of the mind, 
rather than upon transitory personal attractions'" (11). The use of the words "affection.'" 
"esteem," and "amiable" makes it clear that Tenney is alluding to the model of 
companionate love. Lysander does eventually come to admire Dorcasina. but she is 
sorely disappointed by the subdued and rational manner of his courtship. When the match 
between them fails as a consequence of her "whimsical and romantic" (13) response to 
his advances. Lysander feels relieved to have escaped a "connexion with a woman whose 
ideas of matrimonial happiness were too exalted ever to be realized" (14). This comment 
evokes the critical and moralistic commonplace, alluded to earlier, that novel-inspired 
notions of love result in disappointment with the way that marriages are transacted in the 
real world. Much later in the novel, when Dorcasina is forty-five years old, she is once 
again courted by a legitimate suitor. Again, she is disgusted by the businesslike tone of 
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his suit, and this t ime her rejection of the safe, mundane marriage is made to seem even 
more contemptible due to her advanced age and increasing physical grotesqueness. 
When Dorcasina is finally cured of her romantic delusions, she is old. physically 
repulsive, and alone in the world. The novel ends with her own words, set out in a letter 
to a distant friend, which underscore the illusory character of the romantic ideal that has 
led her to this final, tragic state. She sums up her experience by saying, "this imprudent 
indulgence has been the cause of m y ruin. I now find that I have passed my life in a 
dream, or rather a delirium; and have grown grey in chasing a shadow, which has always 
been fleeing from me, in pursuit of an imaginary happiness, which, in this life, can never 
be realized" (323). The use of terms such as "dream," "delirium," "shadow." and 
"imaginary" provides a redundancy of images associated with insubstantiality, lest the 
progress of the preceding narrative has left the reader with any doubt that the romantic 
vision of love is, in fact, nonexistent. Finally, in order to firmly anchor the blame for 
inspiring this false and destructive vision. Dorcasina provides her friend with advice to 
follow should she ever have daughters: 
Withhold from their eye the pernicious volumes, which, while they convey false 
ideas of life, and inspire illusory expectations, will tend to keep them ignorant of 
every thing really worth knowing; and which, if they do not eventually render 
them miserable, may at least prevent their becoming respectable. Suffer not their 
imaginations to be filled with ideas of happiness, particularly in the connubial 
state, which can never be realized. Describe life to them as it really is, and as you 
have yourself found it. chequered with good and evil. (325) 
The novel thus ends with an explicit warning that misery and a loss of respectability are 
the likely result of confusing the "chequered" truth of the world with the cheerful 
falsehoods found in those "pernicious volumes," novels. 
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While Tenney focuses on the idea that novel reading can lead to elevated 
expectations of—and, ultimately, pathological disappointment with—the state of love 
and courtship in the real world, Confessions of the Nun of St. Omer and Romance 
Readers and Romance Writers present an even bleaker vision. In Female Quixotism, 
Dorcasina ends up miserable, but with her virtue uncompromised; Cazire in Confessions 
and Margaritta and Isabella in Romance Readers are not so fortunate. Though Dacre and 
Green touch on the notion that reading inspires unrealizable ideals, the peril that they 
emphasize most strongly is the one alluded to by such moralists as Hannah Forster 
Webster and Hannah More: that of seduction. According to both Dacre and Green, there 
arc varying degrees of danger inherent in different kinds of reading. Romances and 
sentimental novels, while fostering indolence, a surfeit of imagination, and foolish 
longings for love, also uphold certain moral standards; the type of passion that they 
advocate is impractical and unrealistic, but it is not untrammelled lust. The novels written 
by French and German free-thinkers, on the other hand, endorse free love and 
extramarital relationships, threatening to corrupt the sexual mores of young women by 
introducing them to "false" notions about the legitimacy of such unconventional unions. 
In these cases, the truth-fiction distinction that the quixote novels seek to emphasize rests 
more in the realm of morality than that of practicality; Dacre and Green accuse the free-
thinking novelists of substituting licentious lies for the real world 's absolute moral truths 
about the sanctity of marriage. 
Late in Dacre 's Confessions, St. Elmer, who is the intensely admirable husband of 
the heroine, Cazire, reflects on his earlier prediction of the possible fates that her reading 
habits might bring upon her, saying. "1 perceived with acute regret that, led away by a 
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wild and fallacious enthusiasm, you would become unfit for the uniformity of wretched 
existence, and sink into misery and gloom, or fatally change the scene by wandering in 
the paths of error" (3.28). His assessment corresponds neatly with the two major streams 
of concern about the effects of novel reading during this period—that a fiction-inflamed 
imagination can only be miserable among the mundane truths of existence, and that such 
an imagination may be easily seduced into wandering the paths of error—as well as with 
the two types of novel that have led Cazire to these very ends. 
The distinctions between bad reading material and worse reading material, along 
with their respective dangers, are clearly defined throughout Confessions. The first, and 
less serious, threat is that posed to the imagination of the heroine, Cazire, by romances. 
Writing her confessions at the end of her sordid, novel-reading career. Cazire laments, 
"my imagination wanderjed] uncontrolled in the fairy regions of fiction and romance, m y 
heart seduced by its resistless power, while my reason seemed like a distressed pilot in a 
storm, essaying in vain to rule the boisterous gales which threatened its destruction" 
(1.67). Cazire 's inability to bring her reason to bear on the fantastic material that she 
reads thus results in her internalization of foolishly romantic ideas, and her view of the 
world is skewed by an excess of imagination. This passage reflects the common 
nineteenth-century assumption that women were virtually incapable of reading critically, 
and that their feeble rational powers were easily overcome by any fanciful assertion. 
As in Female Quixotism, the model of companionate love is invoked and 
compared to the type of amorous transports experienced by romantic heroines. Cazire 
lists the forms of devotion that her reading has led her to desire of a suitor, contrasting 
them to the far more subdued emotions usually attendant on a companionate attachment: 
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. . . [H]is eyes, his actions must declare his love, his idolatry; he must adore me 
with enthusiasm, shun, detest those whom I hated, admire, esteem those I loved, 
think no sacrifice too great for me, not his life if mine could be preserved, and 
despite even that if I existed no longer: know no happiness but in m y society, 
lament to quit and joy in returning to it, watch over my couch in sickness, and 
droop when I grieved, listen with transport to my slightest wishes, let nor ennui 
nor satiety blast our peace, but look on me as his world, his treasure, and his life. 
Never, never could 1 meet a being who would love me thus: none other could 
possess m y love; better then never taste the dangerous stream but in its highest, 
purest state, or inevitable wretchedness would be our mutual lot; for I disdain the 
thought of a "luke-warm attachment," a "sincere regard!" (1.118) 
Interestingly, this passage suggests that Cazire is perfectly aware that her romantic 
demands are unrealistic, but that she is unable to moderate her desires despite her 
recognition of their impossibility. Compared to the acknowledged fiction of the romantic 
ideal, the types of "at tachment" or "sincere regard" cited as desirable foundations for 
marriage strike her as hollow. Dacre thus reinforces the idea that w o m e n ' s rational 
faculties are ineffectual by implying that, once unattainable visions of love are introduced 
into the female brain, even the conscious recognition of their impossibility is not 
sufficient to displace them. The implication is that, after being exposed to such 
compelling fancies, a girl is irreversibly condemned to a lifetime of longing and 
disappointment. 
Ironically, while this dissatisfaction allegedly results from scenes of romantic 
ecstasy insinuating themselves into the imagination, Dacre suggests that the greater 
threat, that of seduction, is carried out through appeals to the faculty of reason: 
Some of the books I perused were more calculated than others to corrupt the 
understanding: these were most dangerous: they tolerated the free sentiments they 
infused, and spoke to the susceptible heart in a language wholly irresistible; love 
was painted happy only when unfettered; 1 felt, as I became enslaved with the 
brilliancy of the language and speciousness of the arguments, that they must be 
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just : thus did m y sentiments become more dangerous than ever, for they assumed 
the garb of reason. (1.71) 
While romances play on the feminine excess of imagination, the novels espousing 
philosophies of free love are specifically calculated "to corrupt the understanding" by 
assuming "the garb of reason" and taking explicit advantage of women ' s scant capacity 
for logic. Thus, unlike in the case of her purely romantic ideas, Cazire does not even 
perceive the falseness of the notions that she imbibes from the more immoral 
publications. Ultimately, this gives them the power to displace the romantic ideal, the two 
attitudes towards love being essentially antithetical. Though romances advocate 
passionate love and often culminate in elopements, their attitude towards extramarital 
relations is distinctly prudish. 
The relative severity of the threat posed by each sort of literature is made clear by 
the fact that the villains of Confessions, free-thinkers who encourage Cazire in her 
reading of novels with indecent leanings, warn her against the imaginative excesses of 
romance. The first, named Fribourg. writes in a letter: 
. . . [RJemember, Cazire, that real life, and life depicted in romance, are widely 
different; through all its variations, the former seldom concludes happily; the 
latter is twisted from the breast of probability; events are made subservient, and 
the false imagery ends in a delusive peace; romances corrupt the imagination, and 
fill it with visions of chaotic inconsistencies. (1.221) 
These could pass for the words of a strict moralist, rather than those of a confirmed 
libertine who ultimately seduces Cazire and kills her saintly husband in a duel. Lindorf. 
the father of her bastard child, also refers contemptuously to sentimental love as "the 
romantic dream of novel reading misses, the wild effervescence of an enthusiastic brain" 
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(2.43). The laudable pragmatism that his assessment seems to espouse when taken out of 
context is undermined by the fact that Lindorf is not advocating the alternative of 
companionate love, but rather of another sort of love entirely. 
In Romance Readers and Romance Writers, the difference between romances and 
those works of a more insidious and corrupting tendency is articulated still more 
explicitly. Initially, the taste of the anti-heroine, Margaret, runs strictly to romance 
novels, and Green offers the standard criticisms about the effects of these works on the 
imagination. Margaret ' s infinitely more admirable sister. Mary, comments that she does 
not get much use out of their subscription to the circulating library because "Margaret 
sends for such incredible, such marvellous kind of works, that I shut the books with 
disgust, and seldom have patience to read them through" (1.10). Unlike Margaret, Mary 
is capable of discerning the difference between reality and the fantastic worlds of 
romance, and she therefore has no interest in reading about the latter. This suggests that 
only individuals who cannot make this important distinction, and who are therefore at 
risk of being seriously misguided by their reading, enjoy romances. As a young lady of 
altogether laudable habits, Mary herself is far better amused by reading the books of her 
"small and elegant library, from the best approved writers of female improvement" 
(1.12)—from the very authors, that is to say. who pen the conduct manuals proscribing 
Margaret ' s brand of reading. 
In her romance-reading phase, Margaret is depicted as an even more than usually 
stupid and contemptible quixote figure, obsessed with her reading and subject to 
ridiculous misconceptions of the real world. However, it is noted several times that her 
father, a man of "solid sense, untainted religion, virtue, and honesty" (1.8) never forbids 
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her to read romances, because their morals are "irreproachable and strict in the ex t reme" 
(2.14). Green characterizes romances as well-intentioned, if absurdly improbable, works 
whose undesirable spurring of the imagination might ultimately be outgrown. These ideas 
are illustrated by the following passage, which also intimates Margaret 's father's belief 
that her fascination with romances may actually help to stave off more nefarious types of 
literary influence: 
.. . [T]o entirely prohibit those kind of books (the morals of which, however 
absurd their incidents and events, were unexceptionable) would be only to teach 
the gaining them b y stealth; and then, works of a more dangerous tendency might 
corrupt the heart and undermine the principles of his girl: while the works she 
now perused, only ensnared the imagination for a time; and as her years 
increased, he hoped she would be able to see the folly of giving credit to them, 
and only draw from them those sentiments and feelings which they were intended 
by their authors to inspire:—an admiration of their ingenuity, and the grandeur 
and sublimity of their language; with an abhorrence of vice, and a sincere love 
and veneration for virtue. (1.46) 
Green thus represents romances as combining an unfortunate lack of realism with 
genuinely admirable morals—such as m a y help to undermine any threat to Dorcasina\s 
virtue in Female Quixotism—whereas the "works of a more dangerous tendency" are, as 
in Confessions, accused of conveying false morals to susceptible minds by clothing them 
in a realistic guise. 
The latter vessels of corruption are put into Margaret 's hands through the agency 
of the second delinquent reader in the text, the aristocratic Lady Isabella: 
Like Margaritta, she was very fond of modern publications, but her studies were 
of a different kind, and all consisted of false systems ... for her lighter reading she 
perused the loose sentiments contained in the French novels of Faublas; he Fils 
naturel, and all the dangerous works of Diderot, and other revolutionary writers. 
The effects of such studies on a mind like that of Lady Isabella 's may well be 
conceived; marriage she held in utter contempt, openly expatiated on the folly of 
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all the outward ceremonies of religion, and was a very pretty female atheist. 
(1.16) 
Green 's intense disapproval of Isabella 's status as "a very pretty female atheist" forms an 
interesting inversion of her criticism of Margaret 's excessive credulity. Whi le Margaret is 
mocked for too-readily believing the literal events described in fictional works . Isabella is 
decried for disbelieving in the importance of those doctrines relating to the sanctity of 
marriage and religion that society holds to be self-evidently valid. As in Confessions, the 
danger of the corrupting novels lies in the way that they appeal to the reason, rather than 
to the imagination, requiring no suspension of disbelief in order to validate the "false 
systems" they outline. This idea is articulated when Isabella tells Margaret, "I am the 
most romantic creature living; but quite in a different way; 1 never go beyond probability; 
and the romances 1 peruse, shew me, if not the exact picture of human life, at least what it 
ought to be: I'll send you some of my books; they will not stuff your brain with ideas of 
ghosts, magic and witchcraft" (2.11). The similarity to the pattern of Cazire"s downfall in 
Confessions is thus continued, with Isabella's derisive attitude towards the improbability 
of Margaret 's romances paralleling the words of Fribourg and Lindorf. 
After perusing such works, on Isabella's recommendation, as Madame de Stael 's 
Delphine and Rousseau 's La Nouvelle Heloise, Margaret languishes for "a congenial soul 
of the opposite sex, with whom she could experience the extatic raptures proceeding from 
the unrestrained and delightful union of hearts, where no vulgar 'human t ie ' should 
render common their moments of superlative bl iss" (2.14). Her newfound disbelief in the 
"human tie" of marriage makes her vulnerable to the seductive wiles of a dastardly young 
nobleman, and she soon finds herself pregnant and abandoned. Isabella, by this time, is in 
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precisely the same situation, and this redundancy in the narrative serves to suggest the 
uniformity of the fates of young women who take to reading French novels. Ultimately, 
though Margaret ' s family comes charitably to the aid of both girls, neither has a happy 
end: Margaret is forced to live out her life under an assumed name, in the guise of a 
widow, and we are told that Isabella longs for death, looking "anxiously forward to that 
period, when she shall receive the unalloyed happiness promised to the truly penitent" 
(3.69). 
In contrast to the relative unselfconsciousness of the didactic novels, which focus 
their criticism on texts other than themselves, the more humorous instances of the female 
quixote genre do tend to manifest an awareness of their own textuality. The didactic 
texts ' sober conviction of the intellectual and moral danger of unwise reading is replaced 
in these novels by a playful critique of the aesthetic conventions of the romance genre. 
Though Austen 's Nonhanger Abbey and Barrett 's The Heroine. Or Adventures of 
Cherubina share many conventions with the works discussed above, the overall effect is 
therefore quite different. One way of understanding the difference is in terms of the 
distinction between parody and satire. In A Theory of Parody, Linda Hutcheon 
distinguishes between the two by pointing out that, while "the object of parody is always 
another work of art." satire "is both moral and social in its focus and ameliorative in its 
intention" (16). It is clear that most female quixote novels incorporate both parodic and 
satiric tendencies, lampooning not only the quixotic reader, but also the excesses of the 
fictions to which she subscribes: however, these tendencies are present in markedly 
different proportions. According to Hutcheon 's definition, works such as those of Tenney 
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and Green are predominantly satirical in their aims. They effect their moral purpose b y 
focusing on the description of the deluded reader and her foolish actions, without drawing 
attention to textual similarities and differences between the work at hand and those that it 
parodies. The parodic element thus becomes secondary in these novels, the resemblance 
in plot structure between the parodied and parodying texts being essentially a function of 
the female quixote 's novel-induced behaviour. Driven by a conviction of the genuine 
moral danger posed to young women by novel reading, these works are more interested 
in criticizing the effects of reading than in setting themselves up for comparison to the 
maligned reading material. 
Austen and Barrett, on the other hand, place far more emphasis on the parodic 
elements of their respective novels. Though satire is inseparable from any ironic 
treatment of the female quixote theme—quixotism being a quality associated with the 
reading of literature, rather than with literature per se—these authors appear to play the 
satirical angle more for its entertainment value than with a strong didactic purpose. 
Northanger Abbey and The Heroine share an overt awareness of their own status as 
literary creations, and of their own purposeful deviations from the works that they 
parody. Hutcheon argues that one of the characteristics of parody is that it "self­
consciously and self-critically recognizes its own nature" (27), and the inward turn of the 
parodic gaze that is implied by this description is a great deal more evident in these two 
examples of the female quixote narrative than in their more didactic counterparts. This 
self-reflexivity contributes an extra layer of sophistication to the irony with which these 
works treat the topic of novels and novel reading. Also, because they do not appear to be 
holding up their heroines as sincere and sober warnings against the dangers of reading. 
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the tone in which Austen and Barrett write implies a greater complicity with their own 
readers—a shared wink over the mutually acknowledged fictionality of all fiction, not 
least the work at hand. 
Like the didactic novelists, then, these authors employ the means of female 
quixotism to illustrate the disparity between fiction and reality, but to a different end. The 
point, in the two parodic novels here discussed, is not that readers should avoid patterning 
their lives after fictions, but rather that fictions should aim to be more true to life. As 
Hutcheon comments, parody "marks the interaction of creation and re-creation, of 
invention and critique" (Hutcheon 101), and these works clearly have an interest in 
promoting an alternative aesthetic to the one that drives the fiction they critique, however 
sympathetically. In order to achieve this goal, The Heroine and Northanger Abbey 
employ considerably different strategies. Barret t 's quixote figure, Cherubina, is a farcical 
extreme who comments continually and outrageously on her own slavish adherence to the 
conventions of gothic fiction. In the spirit of textual self-consciousness, many of her 
remarks carry a distinct double-entendre with respect to her situation as the ipso facto 
heroine of Barrett 's own fiction, as well as of her own fantasy world. Austen ' s Catherine 
Morland. in contrast, is depicted with a much higher degree of realism than her various 
sisters in quixotism. In Northanger Abbey, the ironic self-consciousness belongs entirely 
to the narrator, freeing Catherine herself to behave in the relatively natural manner 
characteristic of Austen 's later fiction. This juxtaposition of the parodic and realistic 
styles is Austen 's way of supplementing her good-humoured critique of gothic fiction 
with the suggestion of an alternative to it: her own realistic and understated style of 
writing. 
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On the subject of The Heroine, Archibald Shepperson writes. "Barrett cannot be 
given entire credit for the improvement that took place in the English novel in the second 
and third decades of the nineteenth century. . . . But a share of the credit certainly belongs 
to Barrett, whose book was readable, witty, timely, and, what is more to the point, was 
widely read' ' (172). Indeed, though it has since fallen into near-oblivion, having been out 
of print since 1927 (Horner 3), The Heroine was enormously popular in the decade after 
its publication in 1813, and it was received by nineteenth-century critics with great 
enthusiasm. In "On English Prose Fiction as a Rational Amusement ," Trollope 
incorporates an endorsement of Barret t 's novel into his criticism of the type of writing it 
mocks, saying. "The only story which I can recommend to m y hearers as connected with 
the Minerva Press is a satire on its productions called the 'Heroine. ' written by Mr. 
Barre t t . . . a burlesque, and a very excellent burlesque" (98). Edgar Allan Poe also waxes 
enthusiastic in his 1835 review of The Heroine: 
There are few books written with more tact, spirit, naivete, or grace, few which 
take hold more irresistibly upon the attention of the reader, and none more fairly 
entitled to rank among the classics of English literature than the Heroine [sic] of 
Eaton Stannard Barrett. When we say all this of a book possessing not even the 
remotest claim to originality, either in conception or execution, it may reasonably 
be supposed, that we have discovered in its matter, or manner, some rare qualities, 
inducing us to hazard an assertion of so bold a nature. This is actually the case. 
Never was any thing so charmingly written: the mere style is positively 
inimitable. (41) 
Poe acknowledges the fact that Barrett 's work belongs squarely to the much-exercised 
tradition inaugurated by Cervantes, but his fervent praise of the novel indicates that 
something sets it apart from the run-of-the-mill quixote novel. The stylistic sparkle that 
35 
so impresses Poe relates to a quality of The Heroine that is essentially lacking in many of 
its forebears: its witty self-referentiality. 
As Poe suggests, the basic plot and premise of the novel are entirely typical of its 
genre. Cherry, an inveterate romance reader, tires of her prosaic and uneventful life, re-
christens herself "Cherubina," and sets out to experience adventures worthy of a heroine. 
Along the way, her romantic imagination leads her into many comical misunderstandings 
of people and events. Ultimately, her ultra-rational childhood friend. Stuart, rescues her 
from her own delusions and. having expounded on the importance of learning about life 
from life itself rather than from fiction, marries her. The narrative is epistolary, taking the 
form of a one-sided series of letters from Cherubina to her former governess, also a 
habitual novel reader, who has been dismissed by Cherubina 's father for kissing the 
butler. The plot is set in motion when the disgraced governess takes revenge on her 
former employer by suggesting to Cherubina that she is not. in fact, her father's daughter, 
but a child of mysterious origin. 
Unlike Cazire 's after-the-fact epistolary narration in Confessions of the Nun of St. 
Omer, Cherubina 's telling of her own talc is to-the-moment. Despite her eventual reform 
at the hands of Stuart, therefore, the narrative is not coloured by tcleological didacticism; 
instead, most of the novel is rendered from the perspective of a heroine in the process of 
gleefully abandoning herself to her fantasies. Because the story is told entirely in the first 
person, Cherubina not only fills the role of the deluded reader, but also acts in the usual 
capacity of the third-person narrator, commenting directly on the conventions of romantic 
novels and her own relationship to them. Her simultaneous awareness of the romantic 
formula and explicit acknowledgment that her "ambition is to be a Heroine" (1.14) in her 
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own story underline Cherubina 's status as a textual entity. She is an emphatically two-
dimensional character, observing the progress of her own fiction and herself as a player 
within it. even as the external reader does the same. Paul Lewis, an extraordinarily 
humourless modern critic of The Heroine, complains that "It is difficult to take Cherry 
seriously as a character because Barrett, failing to create a plausible psychological history 
for her, treats her as the reductio ad absurdum of Gothic readers" (48). What Lewis 
apparently fails to grasp is that Cherubina 's implausibility is, in many ways, the point. 
We are not supposed to take her seriously as a character, and she is in fact intended more 
as the reductio ad absurdum of the gothic heroine than of the gothic reader, as Barrett 's 
title indicates. 
In a preface headed "The Heroine to the Reader,*' Cherubina immediately 
introduces herself as a fictional construct. She explains that all fictitious personages are 
incarnated on the moon, and she goes on to describe her interactions with various famous 
examples. For instance, she meets Don Quixote himself and finds him to be a kindred 
soul (5); she also encounters "the Radcliffian. Rochian, and other heroines" (6) and says 
of them, "they tossed their heads, and told me pertly that 1 was a slur on the sisterhood; 
while some went so far as to say that I had a bad design upon their lives. They likewise 
shunned the Edgeworthian heroines, whom they thought too comic, moral, and natural" 
(6). Barrett thus establishes his novel and its heroine as not only parodying, but also 
belonging to the tradition of fiction; unlike the outward-looking commentary provided by 
the didactic quixote-novels, Barrett 's fiction never loses sight of its own nature. The self-
referential tone of the text is further reinforced by the explicit critiques made of The 
Heroine by some of the other inhabitants of the moon. Junius, for example, says to 
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Cherubina, "the writer who sent you amongst us , had far too much to say, and too little to 
d o " (7), and Tristram Shandy bets, 
. , . | Y]ou will get miserably mauled by their reverences, the Reviewers. My life for 
it, they will say that your character is a mere daub drawn in distemper—the hair 
too golden—an eyelash too much—then that the book itself has too little of the 
rational and argumentative; that the fellow merely wrote it to make the world 
laugh.—and, by the bye, to make the world laugh is the gravest occupation an 
author can chuse. . . . In fine, Madam, it will appear that the work has every fault 
which must convict i t . . . but which will leave it not the ninety-ninth part of a gry 
the worse in the eyes of fifteen mill ions of honest Britons. (8-9) 
Apart from drawing attention to Cherubina"s hyper-fictionality, Tristram Shandy's 
remarks also underscore the chief motive underlying Barrett 's novel: humour. Despite the 
token "rational and argumentative" passage in which Stuart discusses the inadvisability 
of drawing one ' s ideas solely from romances. The Heroine makes no concerted effort to 
advance the conservative ideas about novel reading that figure so prominently in many 
other quixote-novels. Barrett unapologetically identifies his purpose as being to make 
people laugh, and the primary object of the joke is clearly fiction itself, not its readers. 
Cherubina is too blatantly unrealistic to serve as a sincere warning against excessive 
romanticism, but the mockery of gothic conventions is quite proportional to their 
absurdity. 
The irony inherent in Cherubina 's triple role as would-be heroine, actual heroine, 
and inadvertent commentator on the silliness of narrative conventions is evident early in 
the story. At the beginning of the first volume, she envies her governess 's having been 
"cast upon the world, unprotected and defamed; while [she is] doomed to endure the 
security of a home, and the dullness of an unimpeached reputation." She laments, "For 
me, there is no hope whatever of being reduced to despair. 1 am condemned to waste m y 
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health, bloom, and youth, in a series of uninterrupted prosperity'" (1.14). By having the 
heroine of a novel describe her own situation and aspirations in such terms, rather than 
assigning the task to a cynical, third-person narrator, Barrett leaves no doubt about the 
fact that she is not intended to be even remotely lifelike. 
Indeed, her comments are continual reminders that she not only aspires to be a 
heroine, but is the heroine of The Heroine itself—a pen-and-ink creature in an artificial 
universe. Though the comparisons that she makes between herself and the heroines of 
romance serve mainly to underline the differences between the types of fiction in 
question, they also keep in view the connection between Barrett 's novel and the texts it 
parodies, pointing out the contrived nature of both. In fact. Cherubina puts herself forth 
as the purposeful contriver of her own story; her imitation of romantic tropes is self-
conscious and wilful, designed to produce a book of memoirs to rival the most fantastic 
of romances. Thus, at one point she asserts. 
I see plainly, that if adventure does not come to me, 1 must go to adventure. And 
indeed, I am authorised in doing so by the example of my sister heroines; who. 
with a noble disinterestedness, are ever the chief artificers of their own 
misfortunes: for, in nine cases out of ten, were they to manage matters like mere 
common mortals, they would avoid all those charming mischiefs which adorn 
their memoirs. (1.39) 
As this passage demonstrates, Barrett 's technique of embedding his critique of romance ' s 
more hamhanded plot devices within Cherubina 's own enthusiastic endorsements of the 
same lends The Heroine a devastating!)' deadpan humour. Her commentary extends also 
to stylistic issues, as when she notes. 
You see 1 relate the several conversations, in a dramatic manner, and word for 
word, as well as I can recollect them, since heroines do the same. Indeed, I cannot 
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too much admire the fortitude of these charming creatures, who , even while they 
were in momentary expectation of losing their honors, sit down with the utmost 
unconcern, and indite the sprightliest letters in the world. They have even 
presence of mind enough to copy the vulgar dialect, uncouth phraseology, and bad 
grammar of villains, who, perhaps, are in the next room to them, and who would 
not matter [sic] annihilating them with poignard, while they are mending a pen. 
(1.23) 
Apart from conveying the irony of Cherubina 's evident admiration for impossibly 
thorough and accurate epistolary accounts and other romantic conventions of dubious 
credibility, her ruminations on the mechanics of composition remind us that we are. in 
fact, reading a constructed text. The reader is thus explicitly encouraged to examine the 
narrative and stylistic strategies not only of Cherubina"s cherished romances, but also of 
the work at hand. 
Many female quixote figures tend to understand the incidents described in 
romances as true events, entirely independent of their storybook contexts: in Cherubina 's 
mind, however, heroines ' lives are firmly associated with written narratives. While she 
does believe that romances are the true memoirs of heroines, she also views their 
experiences as being structured according to explicitly literary conventions—and 
considers the ultimate purpose of experience to be the generation of novels. She 
conceives of her life as a text and describes its progress in terms of volumes, pages, and 
plots. At one point, for example, she instructs her unromantically overweight, 
respectable, and middle-class father to "never again attempt to get [himself] thrust into 
the pages of a romance" (1.105); she also opines that a would-be suitor "did not shew 
much judgment in urging [her] to matrimony, before [she] had undergone adventures for 
four volumes" (1.102). Similarly, when she leaves a shop without paying for a bonnet, 
she tells the irate shop owner. 
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. . . [A]s I like your face, I mean to implicate you in m y plot, and make you one of 
the dramatis personae in the history of m y life. Probably you will turn out to be 
m y mother ' s nurse 's daughter. At all events, I give you m y word I will pay you at 
the denouement, when the other characters are provided for; and meantime, to 
secure your acquaintance, I must insist on owing you the money. (1.65-66) 
Cherubina is not merely attempting to work elements of romance into her life, but 
working expressly to mould her life into an actual romantic narrative. Thus, we as readers 
are made privy to the trope-by-trope composition process of a failed romance—and of a 
successful parody. 
Ultimately, then, The Heroine retools the conventional female quixote story into 
an instrument for critiquing the undeniable excesses of romance writing, rather than the 
popularly al leged—and no doubt exaggerated—problems caused by romance reading. In 
presenting us with a heroine who is so overtly a figment of fiction that she refers to 
herself as a character in a story. Barrett creates such a high level of comedic self-
consciousness in the novel that there is no room for the articulation or demonstration of a 
serious alternative aesthetic. In using pure parody to playfully highlight the artistic 
failings of romance, however. The Heroine is successful, and. according to Shepperson, it 
had a "salutary influence on the taste of novel writers and novel readers" (172) in its 
time. 
One of the novel writers to whom Barrett 's novel appealed is Jane Austen. In a 
letter dated 2 March 1814, Austen writes, "1 finished The Heroine last night and was very 
much amused by it . . . It diverted me exceedingly . . . 1 have torn through the third volume 
. . . I do not think it falls off. It is a delightful burlesque particularly on the Radcliffe s tyle" 
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(qtd. in Homer and Zlosnick). Aus ten ' s own famous contribution to the female quixote 
genre, Northanger Abbey (composed c. 1798-1803, published 1818), shares The 
Heroine's relative unconcern with the dangers of novel reading and goes a step farther to 
actively celebrate the writers and readers of fiction, with the author proudly including 
herself in both categories. Even as a parody of gothic conventions. Austen ' s approach is 
comparatively gentle and sympathetic. Linda Hutcheon cites her work as exemplifying a 
use of parody that challenges "the definition of parody as the conservative ridiculing of 
artistic fashion's extremes" (11), and, indeed, Aus ten ' s attitude towards the texts she 
parodies tends more towards fond ribbing than genuine criticism. In a well-known 
passage, she celebrates the novel as a form "in which the greatest powers of the mind arc 
displayed, in which the most thorough knowledge of human nature, the happiest 
delineation of its varieties, the liveliest effusions of wit and humour are conveyed to the 
world in the best chosen language" (34). Like Barrett, Austen has written a novel that is 
openly conscious of its own status as fiction, and, what is more, that explicitly classes 
itself alongside the gothic and sentimental novels in which its heroine indulges. Despite 
its positive attitude towards these other works, however, Northanger Abbey does mark 
the differences between itself and them, thereby implicitly endorsing an alternative, more 
realistic ideal of fiction. 
In terms of the characterization of her heroine, Austen has followed essentially 
the opposite course from Barrett; in contrast to the cardboard cut-out that is Cherubina, 
Catherine Morland of Northanger Abbey is more believable as a person than virtually any 
other example of the female quixote figure. In the first volume of the novel. Catherine is 
pointedly depicted as being essentially practical and unromantic. responding to people 
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and situations as any normal individual might be expected to do. When she leaves her 
home and family, for example, her departure is conducted "with a degree of moderation 
and composure, which seem[s] rather consistent with the common feelings of common 
life, than with the refined susceptibilities, the tender emotions which the first separation 
of a heroine from her family ought always to excite" (18). Later in the novel. Austen 
describes a scene in which the hero, Henry Tilney, is "talking with interest to a 
fashionable and pleasing-looking young woman, who leanfs] on his arm, and whom 
Catherine immediately guessefs] to be his sister; thus unthinkingly throwing away a fair 
opportunity of considering him lost to her for ever, by being married already" (49). 
Her behaviour in the second volume, when she visits Northanger Abbey and is 
victim to a number of far-fetched, gothic fancies, does border on the forehead-slappingly 
silly; however, Catherine at least has the sense to be aware of and embarrassed by the 
absurdity of her notions, even as she embraces them in order to satisfy her "craving to be 
frightened" (173). Catherine 's credulousncss is somewhat more moderate than the typical 
quixote figure's wholesale abandonment to her delusions. Though she searches a 
mysterious cabinet for hidden secrets, she does so while telling herself that she "never 
from the first ha[s] the smallest idea of finding anything in any part of the cabinet" (148). 
and, when the roll of papers that she discovers in the cabinet turns out to be a collection 
of bills, she is ashamed by "the absurdity of her recent fancies" (150). Her paranoia may 
be extreme by real-world standards—but the very fact that we are tempted to judge her 
by such standards attests to the unusual degree of realism that Austen has introduced to 
the conventional quixote story. Catherine is an essentially lifelike character, contained in. 
and controlled by, a self-consciously fabricated text. 
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The self-awareness of Northanger Abbey is conveyed entirely through the voice 
of the narrator. From the outset of the novel. Austen draws attention to her technique of 
allying a realistic style with pointedly unrealistic fictional conventions. She opens by 
describing Catherine as overwhelmingly average and consequently ill-suited to the 
traditional role of heroine, then asserts her own power, as the author of the story, to 
contrive for her credibly middle-of-the-road heroine an improbably romantic narrative 
context—a love story. Thus, the narrator informs us that there are no suitable love 
interests in Catherine's neighbourhood, "But when a young lady is to be a heroine, the 
perverseness of forty surrounding families cannot prevent her. Something must and will 
happen to throw a hero in her way" (16). This self-conscious narrator surfaces repeatedly 
throughout the story to disrupt the appearance of an unmediated relation of events, 
reminding us that the "pen of the contriver" (203) governs all that occurs. She exhibits no 
hesitation in alluding to "the rules of composit ion" (218) that dictate the progress of her 
novel, often with complete disregard to the demands of realism, mocking these rules even 
as she adheres to them. In order to achieve an appropriate ending of "perfect felicity" 
(217), for instance, Austen must provide both of her deserving female characters with 
conventional, happy marriages. To this end. she contrives to introduce a suitable husband 
for one of them on the second-to-last page, legitimating his presence in the story by-
identifying him as the man whose laundry bills Catherine has discovered in the 
mysterious cabinet—and cheerfully pointing out the dishonesty of her own device. 
This juxtaposition of the realistic and parodic modes in Northanger Abbey strikes 
many readers as incongruous. Frank Kearful suggests that "at times the fiction presented 
seems purely (i.e., structurally) satiric and at other times purely novelistic, with the result 
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that our expectations are made to work at cross-purposes" (514). Thus, Catherine's early 
pragmatism conflicts with her delusional actions in the second volume, and the 
conventional progression and resolution of the plot are at odds with the narrator 's ironic 
commentary on these very conventions. In order to understand this contradiction in the 
text, according to George Levine, we must accept "a separation of plot from the primary 
concerns of the novel" (71). Though the action of the story is structured around the 
traditional female quixote storyline, Austen ' s main purpose in Northanger Abbey is 
neither to condemn romantic fiction as hopelessly absurd, nor to offer her readers solemn 
warnings against confusing fiction and reality. As Levine writes, " in the bracing sanity of 
Austen 's world, we could hardly expect her to be unaware of the illusoriness of all 
fictions (or for that matter to think it worth her trouble to write novels to prove i t)" (66). 
Rather, her aim is to provide a humorous illustration of the artifice inherent in all fiction, 
her own relatively realistic brand included. The novel is offered not in the spirit of 
didactic revelation, but rather in the same tone of complicity with her readers as her 
laughing commentary on the absurdity of certain social conventions. 
Austen ' s use of the quixote-narrative thus foregoes the serious moral 
underpinnings that are present in the work of such authors as Tenney, Dacre, and Green. 
Not only does she. like Barrett, emphasize the cliched nature of literary conventions, she 
also extends the scope of her critique to include the type of realism found in her own 
fiction, as well as the more melodramatic modes of gothic and romantic fiction. In 
turning a critical gaze inwards to accentuate its own handling of the balance between 
realism and formulaic fictional conventions. Northanger Abbey provides a complex 
bridge between the outward-looking, didactic female quixote genre and the type of self-
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interrogating fiction exemplified by the novels of William Thackeray, whose work is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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III. Truth and Fiction in Thackeray 
Society will not tolerate the Natural in our Art . . . . If truth is not always 
pleasant, at any rate truth is best, from whatever chair—from those whence 
graver writers or thinkers argue, as from that at which the story-teller s i ts . . . . 
-W. M. Thackeray, Preface to Pendennis 
As the epigraph to this chapter suggests, William Thackeray was a man 
exasperated with artifice. He believed that "humbugs and falsenesses and pretensions" 
(Vanity Fair 70) were rampant in both society and literature, and he determined that his 
fiction should expose, rather than perpetuate, this tendency towards fraudulence. His 
agenda as a novelist was therefore twofold: to honestly depict the surfeit of falseness in 
the world and to reduce the degree of "humbug" involved in the production and 
consumption of fiction. Thus, as Juliet McMaster writes in her book Thackeray: The 
Major Novels, "The emphasis on the incongruity between romance and reality, or 
between the pose and the truth, is both subject and technique in Vanity Fair' (32). As a 
literary technique, this emphasis on the fiction-reality divide is an important part of 
Thackeray's aesthetic. 
In this chapter, 1 will argue that, while novels such as Vanity Fair and The History 
of Pendennis share the didactic quixote novels ' rejection of romantic excess, their 
motives for highlighting the gap between fiction and reality are fundamentally different. 
By forcing the reader 's gaze to shift between the fictional world of the novel and the 
reality of lived experience, Thackeray insists that we employ the same standards for 
analyzing both—and that those standards be the ones that we have developed through 
interaction with the real world. Unlike Tenney, Dacre, and Green, who caution readers 
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against approaching life with expectations learned from the artificial realm of fiction, 
Thackeray demands that we discard such expectations when approaching fiction itself. 
He is not concerned that readers will "misread" the real world due to novel-induced 
fantasies, because it is clear to him that people 's attitudes towards fiction and reality are 
all too distinct; as Jack P. Rawlins observes in Thackeray's Novels: A Fiction that Is 
True, "We read romantic novels with an easy moral absolutism and live according to a 
more pragmatic creed. . . . Thackeray asks us to account for the discrepancy" (13). In 
doing so. he seeks to cultivate a more discerning readership for a brand of fiction that 
attempts to escape the unnatural absurdities of romance. 
Like the works of Barrett and Austen discussed in the last chapter, Thackeray 's 
writing is intensely self-reflexive, interrogating its own position, as realist fiction, 
between the poles of reality and romance. His novels are peppered with explicit allusions 
not only to the implausibility of accepted narrative conventions, but also to the distinction 
between literary realism and reality itself. A notorious feature of Thackeray 's fiction is 
his use of a wry, intrusive, and decidedly opinionated narrator to comment on the 
characters and the action: often, the narrator steps in to point out where a text adheres to 
and deviates from the frequently opposing dictates of realism and fictional convention. In 
fact, so prolific are such critical interludes in Thackeray's writing that Rawlins has 
described his works as "dissertations on the novel, with a novel provided for discussion" 
(234). With respect to literary matters, the purposes of the commentary are. firstly, to 
assert the importance of verisimilitude in fiction and to draw attention to the realistic 
elements of the text at hand; secondly, to encourage readers, often by addressing them 
directly, to be critical of their own inconsistent expectations for fiction and reality; and, 
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thirdly, to acknowledge the limitations of the novel as a mode of representing reality by 
openly referring to its artificial elements, thus compensating for lapses of realism within 
the narrative by offering truths about the narrative. 
There is nothing understated about the literary criticism that Thackeray embeds in 
his novels: his aesthetic goals are asserted through a combination of overt disdain for the 
implausible elements of conventional fiction and pointed observations on the relative 
realism of his own characters and tales. In the Atlantic Monthly's 1865 review of a new-
American edition of Vanity Fair, Edwin Percy Whipple comments that Thackeray writes 
with the assumption that "the preliminary condition of an accurate knowledge of human 
character is distrust of ideals and repudiation of patterns ' ' (par. 2). This assumption is at 
the heart of Thackeray 's theory of realistic fiction, and, as a result, his vision of realism 
defines itself not only with reference to its similarity to reality, but also in terms of its 
difference from romantic texts. His resistance to formulaic narrative structures and modes 
of characterization exemplifies a propensity that Walter M. Kendrick identifies as 
definitive of naturalism in the late nineteenth century: "the tendency to consider as 
properly ' real ' only what hafs] not been made literary by other writers, to concentrate on 
subjects that hafve] been thought too ordinary or unglamorous for literature'" (70). 
Thackeray 's primary complaint against romantic fiction is that its tone and subject 
matter tend to be elevated beyond any resemblance to the daily lives of real people. In his 
critical study of Thackeray 's work, fellow novelist Anthony Trollope has the following to 
say about "the condition of Thackeray's mind in regard to literary products": 
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The 'humbug ' of everything, the pretence, the falseness of affected sentiment, the 
remoteness of poetical pathos from the true condition of the average minds of 
men and women, struck h im so strongly, that he sometimes allowed himself to 
feel,—or at any rate, to say,—that poetical expression, as being above nature, 
must be unnatural. He had declared to himself that all humbug was odious, and 
should be by him laughed down to the extent of his capacity. (Thackeray 67) 
Because he is reacting against a tradition of rendering fictional subjects in idealized hues 
that are "above nature," Thackeray insists repeatedly throughout his fiction on the 
comparatively debased nature of his own subjects and characters. As we shall see, this 
tactic of defining the realistic in strict opposition to the type of fiction that features noble 
ideals and valiant actions led many nineteenth-century critics, particularly of Vanity Fair, 
to accuse him of misanthropy and cynicism. 
As both Kendrick and Trollope suggest, however, Thackeray's idea of 
appropriately natural, " low" subject matter does not only exclude the actively 
improbable, but also imposes strict limitations on permissible levels of the merely 
extraordinary. Early in the novel, he informs us expressly that, in contrast to more 
conventional fiction and in defiance of his readers" presumed tastes, his book will devote 
space to chronicling the experiences of unremarkable people, "who are taking walks, or 
luncheon, or dinner, or talking and making love as people do in common life, and without 
a single passionate and wonderful incident to mark the progress of their loves" (44). 
Though he promises that "When we come to the proper places we won ' t spare fine 
language." he qualities this pledge with the reproving reminder that "when we are going 
over the quiet country we must perforce be calm. A tempest in a slop-basin is absurd" 
(71). 
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The chiding tone of these passages reveals Thackeray's suspicion that his 
realistically understated pictures of common life may meet with a less-than-cnthusiastic 
reception on the part of readers conditioned to admire tempests wherever they m a y be 
found. These hypothetical aficionados of glory and world-altering events are incarnated 
in the text when the narrator conjures up Jones, whom he envisions as perusing Vanity 
Fair at his club and pronouncing the details of the story so far to be "excessively foolish, 
trivial, twaddling, and ultra-sentimental" (5). In response to this imagined declaration, the 
narrator remarks caustically of Jones. "Well , he is a lofty man of genius, and admires the 
great and heroic in life and novels; and so had better take warning and go e lsewhere" (5). 
It is clear that, in Thackeray's eyes, the haughty Jones is in fact far from being a "lofty 
man of genius." Rather, he is a pretentious fool who hypocritically dismisses the tame 
details of Amel ia ' s life as irrelevant, when his own reality consists of sitting smugly in 
his club, eating mutton and scribbling scornful notes in the margins of novels. By 
introducing the markedly unromantic figure of Jones into the text alongside his central 
characters, Thackeray attempts to deflate anticipated complaints against his decision to 
portray life outside the realm of the "great and heroic." Posed in his condescending 
attitude, Jones reminds us that we . too, are engaged in nothing more heroic than reading a 
novel, and that we should judge events in Vanity Fair by the standards of our own 
mundane lives. 
Even when the story veers towards what appears to be legitimate ground for 
narrative "tempests"—the Battle of Water loo—Thackeray pointedly declines the 
opportunity to document military heroics and grand events. As his leading male 
characters join the ranks of the massing army, he turns the narrative gaze away from 
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them, stating, "We do not claim to rank among the military novelists. Our place is with 
the non-combatants. When the decks are cleared for action, we go below, and wait 
meekly" (275). One reason for Thackeray 's aversion to the battlefield relates to 
Kendrick 's aforementioned observation about the reluctance of authors in pursuit of truth 
to seek it in themes that have already "been made literary" through countless narrative 
iterations. This explanation comes to mind when the narrator complains, in the wake of 
the departing soldiers, "Time out of mind strength and courage have been the theme of 
bards and romances: and from the story of Troy down to to-day, poetry has always 
chosen a soldier for a hero. I wonder is it because men are cowards in heart that they 
admire bravery so m u c h . . . ? " (283). Here, Thackeray is highlighting his determination to 
steer clear of the specious patterns laid down by "bards and romances ." implying that 
courage is prevalent in traditional, epic literature precisely because of its scarcity in the 
real world—and, by extension, that fictional conventions can become entrenched as such 
by virtue of their very remoteness from truth. 
Rather than following his literary predecessors down what he perceives as the 
overly well-worn path of traditional, militaristic heroism, therefore, Thackeray elects to 
remain with the "non-combatants ." in the familiar environment of the domestic sphere. 
This decision demonstrates that his vision of realism is founded not only on the 
plausibility, but also on the relevance of the chosen subject matter. Opportunities for the 
spectacular demonstration of heroism do exist in the real world—but the majority of 
people pass their lives without participating directly in grand or world-altering events. 
Writing in 1844, James Moncreiff suggests that novels can fill a unique function in 
documenting the real state of the world at a particular time, by dealing "with little 
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things-—with common occurrences—ordinary goodnesses and faults—which are beneath 
the notice of moralists or philosophers" (437). Thackeray appears to share this view of 
the novel ' s role and chooses to populate his own works with truths of a different order 
than those contemplated by the '"graver writers and thinkers" that he alludes to in the 
epigraph at the head of this chapter. 
In addition to pointing out his own affinity for subject matter that is 
inconsequential by romantic standards. Thackeray emphasizes the relative realism of his 
fiction by contrasting his characters to traditionally idealized heroes and heroines and 
comparing them to people in the real world. The project of redefining the roles and 
characteristics of a novel ' s central characters looms large in his overall agenda of 
providing fictional conventions with a realist makeover, and this is made evident in the 
subtitles and prefatory matter of Pendennis and Vanity Fair, as well as in some examples 
of correspondence detailing his objectives. 
By subtitling Vanity Fair with that famous proclamation, "A Novel Without a 
Hero ," Thackeray identifies from the outset what he perceives to be the most important 
deviation that he. as an author in pursuit of truth, has made from the conventional 
novelistic pattern: his refusal to provide his readers with a single character with whom 
they can expect to sympathize completely or consistently. This purpose is underscored by 
an 1847 letter from Thackeray to his mother in which he writes, "My object is not to 
make a perfect character or anything like it. Don ' t you see how odious all the people are 
in the book (with the exception of Dobbin)—behind whom there lies a dark moral I 
hope" (qtd. in Dyson 17). A similar indication of the priority that he places on depicting 
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flawed characters is present in the preface to Pendennis, where he declares that the goal 
of the novel is to honestly represent one of "the gentlemen of our age . . . with the 
notorious foibles of their lives and their education": he goes on to complain that, "Since 
the author of Tom Jones was buried, no writer of fiction among us has been permitted to 
depict to his utmost power a M A N " (lvi). While the subtitle of Vanity Fair is 
representative of the way that Thackeray defines his realism in terms of its difference 
from the romantic formula, the quotation from the preface to Pendennis is an example of 
how he underscores the plausibility of his characterizations by comparing them to real 
people. 
In an 1838 essay entitled "On Art in Fiction," Edward Bulwer-Lytton comments 
on the response that an author can expect to receive when attempting to achieve realism 
by depicting either villains with good qualities or good characters with foibles and 
infirmities. His plaintive conclusion is that "in both these applications of art, you will be 
censured by shallow critics and pernicious moralists" (223), and, indeed, the flawed 
denizens of Vanity Fair drew heaps of criticism onto Thackeray's head when the novel 
was published. One reason for this is that none of the characters (including Dobbin, 
despite Thackeray's aforementioned concession that the latter is not "odious") is entirely 
spared from the author 's scathingly satirical gaze; as a result, the novel lacks a firm moral 
centre. While there was ample precedent in fiction for the judicious use of characters 
credibly marbled with positive and negative attributes, it was widely felt that the chief 
protagonist of a work, at least, ought to present an admirable role model. According to 
Hugh Murray 's Morality of Fiction (published in 1805), for example, the bulk of a 
novel ' s inhabitants "may be mixed and imperfect characters"—provided that the leading 
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character, "in whom the reader takes the deepest interest, and with whom he feels 
disposed, as it were, to identify himself," is a paragon of perfection (31). 
Because a novel had to have at least one character earmarked for the reader 's 
unqualified admiration in order to be considered morally legitimate, Thackeray 's artistic 
decision to populate Vanity Fair entirely with flawed characters (and to encumber the 
best of the lot with a "dark moral") received a great deal of negative attention among 
critics. While it might seem to a modern reader that his delineation of the faults and 
virtues of his creations is pretty even-handed, many of his contemporaries—presumably 
because accustomed to a more rose-tinted brand of fiction—are struck by what they 
perceive as the exaggerated darkness of his vision. Critic Robert Bell, for example, has 
reservations on the count of the novel ' s excessively and unrelentingly negative picture of 
human nature. His 1848 review, though positive on the whole, complains that 
It does not enter into the design of Vanity Fair to qualify [the] bitter ingredients 
with a little sweetness now and then; to shew the close neighbourhood of the vices 
and the virtues as it lies on the map of the human heart, that mixture of good and 
evil, of weakness and strength, which, in infinitely varied proportions, constitutes 
the compound individual. (63) 
In this passage. Bell entirely discounts the elements of sweetness, virtue, and strength that 
do figure in Vanity Fair—and, interestingly. Thackeray does not disagree with this 
perception in the letter he directs in reply to Bel l ' s criticism. Rather than arguing that 
most of his characters are, in fact, invested with some form and degree of goodness, he 
simply writes. "If I had put in more fresh air as you call it my object would have been 
defeated. It is to indicate, in cheerful terms, that we are for the most part an abominably 
foolish and selfish people 'desperately wicked" and all eager after vanit ies" (Letter to 
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Robert Bell 67). The tone of both Bell ' s complaint and Thackeray 's response testifies to 
the fact that, for a work of fiction in the mid-nineteenth century, Vanity Fair was 
acknowledged to convey an unusual and even shocking level of misanthropy. 
Even Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake, who indicates in an 1848 article that she greatly 
admires the novel and agrees that it conveys the true condition of humanity, concedes, 
' i n one light this truthfulness is even an objection. With few exceptions the personages 
are too like our every-day selves and neighbours to draw any distinct moral from" (602). 
She goes on to note that "without a little conventional rouge no human complexion can 
stand the stage-lights of fiction" (602). Other supporters of the novel struggle to redeem it 
from a moral standpoint by attempting to efface the slurs that Thackeray has pointedly 
cast against some of the "better" characters. Anthony Trollope, for example, seeks to 
reclaim Amelia as a moral touchstone in the story by asking confidently, "Which attracts 
you, Amelia .—Thackeray 's Amelia, who is not clever but good; or Becky Sharpe, who is 
all intellect and all vi leness" ("On English Prose Fiction" 110). Unfortunately, this 
rhetorical question has the potential to backfire in the mind of any reader who feels that 
Thackeray's satirical bite is never more justly applied than when he refers to Amelia as a 
"tender little parasi te" (Vanity Fair 667). 
By rejecting the idea of the traditional hero, therefore, Thackeray runs counter not 
only to literary tradition, but also to the accepted wisdom on constructing a moral text. 
Throughout Pendennis and Vanity Fair, frequent narrative allusions to the fallibility of 
the main characters serve to remind us that he is resolute in his commitment to portraying 
life as he sees it, rather than as romantics and moralists might wish it to be. His 
descriptive asides are designed to encourage readers to discard the expectations with 
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which they typically approach literary figures and instead base their responses on their 
experience of the real world. In Pendennis, the text ' s self-conscious realism centres 
primarily on the character of Arthur Pendennis . 
Arthur Pendennis—or Pen, as he is called—is undoubtedly "the chief personage 
and godfather" (349) of the novel. He is by no means a hero in the other sense of the 
word, however, and his occupation of the central role in the story without the traditional 
qualifications provides a major thematic focus of the novel. At the same time. Thackeray 
makes it clear that he is not out to demonize his protagonist; rather, he asserts that "our 
endeavour is merely to follow out, in its progress, the development of the mind of a 
worldly and selfish, but not ungenerous or unkind or truth-avoiding m a n " (414). In 
keeping with this stated goal. Pen is described by the narrator as being "weak as well as 
very impetuous, very vain as well as very frank, and if of a generous disposition, not a 
little selfish, in the midst of his profuseness. and also rather fickle, as all eager pursuers 
of self-gratification are" (114). Pen 's friend George Warrington, a bastion of common 
sense, provides a similarly even-handed assessment of Pen's strengths and weaknesses 
when he says, "bating a little wilfulness, and a little selfishness, and a little dandification. 
1 don' t know a more honest, or loyal, or gentle creature" (350). Nonetheless, the flaws in 
Pen 's character influence the course of the story more than his positive traits, leading him 
to spend money recklessly, to fall irresponsibly in love with a series of inappropriate 
women, and to treat his mother and his adopted sister Laura Bell with a complete lack of 
consideration. 
As with Vanity Fair, the subtitle of Pendennis is telling, informing us that the 
protagonist 's history details "His Fortunes and Misfortunes, His Friends and His Greatest 
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Enemy.'* Two-thirds of the way through the novel, the narrator refers back to this 
promise, remarking wryly. "Those kind readers who have watched Mr. Arthur 's career 
hitherto, and have made, as they naturally would do, observations upon the moral 
character and peculiarities of their acquaintance, have probably discovered by this t ime 
... who was that greatest enemy, artfully indicated in the title-page, with w h o m he had to 
contend" (336). In a twist on the conventional novelistic situation, therefore, Pen 's career 
is plagued, not by an external villain of the moustache-twirling variety, but by his own 
shortcomings. Thackeray 's explicit allusion to the subtitle highlights the implied contrast 
between the standard devices responsible for plot-driving conflict and his own, more 
true-to-life emphasis on human weakness. 
Interestingly, not only is Pen imperfectly constituted to inspire and hold a reader 's 
sympathies, he is also substantially less sympathetic than his main foil in the novel. His 
faithful friend Warrington is superior to the designated "chief personage" in countless 
ways, and he actually becomes a rival of sorts for the affections of Pen 's destined love-
match, Laura. Rather than simply presenting us with a realistically fault-ridden 
protagonist moving through a world populated entirely with characters of equally mixed 
characteristics. Thackeray has created what could in some ways have been a traditional 
love story, with the more likely hero displaced by a flawed everyman. 
Pen ' s flaws are revealed most starkly when they are presented in direct 
comparison to Warrington 's virtues, and Laura ' s relationship with both men provides 
plenty of opportunity for such comparison. From the time that Pen and Laura are 
children. Pen 's mother, Helen Pendennis, intends for them to marry. When Pen reaches 
college age, however, he has two imprudent love affairs with other women before 
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resignedly and dispassionately proposing to marry Laura in accordance with Helen 's 
wishes. Offended by the manner of Pen ' s proposal, Laura, who loves him deeply, refuses 
his offer of marriage, and Pen subsequently becomes involved with another woman 
below his station. Later, when a period of excessive working, eating, drinking, smoking, 
"dissipation and society" (336) causes Pen to fall ill, Laura and Warrington are thrown 
together at the side of his sickbed—where they fall in love. 
Unlike Pen, who responds to Laura 's selfless adoration with ingratitude and 
selfishness, Warrington values Laura in proportion to her extraordinary qualities, and his 
own virtues make him a worthy match for her. The narrator describes theirs as a 
relationship 
between two persons whose honour was entirely spotless,—between Warrington, 
who saw in intimacy a pure and high-minded, and artless woman for the first t ime 
in his life,—and Laura, who too for the first time was thrown into the constant 
society of a gentleman of great natural parts and powers of pleasing: who 
possessed varied acquirements, enthusiasm, simplicity, humour, and that 
freshness of mind which his simple life and habits gave him, and which contrasted 
so much with Pen 's dandy indifference of manner and faded sneer. In 
Warrington's very uncouthncss there was a refinement, which the other 's finery 
lacked. In his energy, his respect, his desire to please, his hearty laughter, or 
simple confiding pathos, what a difference to Sultan Pen ' s yawning sovereignty 
and languid acceptance of homage! (351-52) 
There is little doubt that, in a more conventional novel. Laura would end the story 
in the arms of the better man. In Thackeray 's world, however, such poetic justice is not to 
be delivered, and the union between Warrington and Laura is prevented by his being 
already trapped in a marriage with another woman. As a young man of eighteen. 
Warrington explains, he was seduced by the "coarse artifices and scoundrel flatteries" 
(380) of a yeoman 's daughter. He discovered too late not only that she was a dull woman 
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of limited understanding, but also that she had married him for his money while carrying 
on an affair with a man of her own station. Upon learning as much, he left her to her 
lover, settling all of his money upon them in an annuity. In conveying his story to Laura 
and the Pendennises, Warrington laments, "I was the boyish victim of vulgar cheats . . . . I 
was made for a better lot than this, I think: but God has awarded me this one—and so, 
you see. it is for me to look on and see others successful and others happy, with a heart 
that shall be as little bitter as possible"" (381). Indeed, Thackeray, playing the role of God 
with relation to his characters, has made Warrington for the lot of hero and awarded him 
the misfortune of having to look on as a far less deserving man claims his happy ending 
in marriage to the heroine. Thackeray uses Warrington to demonstrate that fictional 
conventions dictating a system of just rewards have no more place in his novel than in the 
real world. 
In order to make this point clear, Pen ' s relative unworthiness of Laura is noted on 
a number of occasions in the story and by various parties. When Pen comes to understand 
that Laura would have married Warrington if not for his unfortunate situation, he is 
himself struck with the realization of his own inferiority: 
"He deserved you better than 1 did." poor Arthur groaned forth, with an 
indescribable pang at his heart. "I am but a selfish wretch, and George is better, 
nobler, truer, than I am. God bless him!" 
"Yes. Pen." said Laura, reaching out her hand to her cousin, and he put his 
arm round her. and for a moment she sobbed on his shoulder. (447) 
Later, once he has come to his senses and proposed a second time, and with proper 
feeling. Pen is accepted by Laura, whose old affection for him has never died. The two 
announce their engagement to Laura 's friend. Lady Rockminster, who voices the 
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probable opinion of many readers when she replies, "It is all very well, but I should have 
preferred Bluebeard" (487)—"Bluebeard" being her nickname for Warrington, and not 
(to Pen 's small credit) an allusion to the legendary wife-killer by the same name. Despite 
his being a more desirable match for Laura than a murderous pirate, however, it is readily 
and repeatedly acknowledged that Pen has been granted a wife who is "a thousand times 
too good for h im" (493), while Warrington has been cheated of her. 
In the final lines of the book, Thackeray takes the opportunity to spell out the two-
pronged moral of the story—which is, equally, a statement of certain principles upon 
which his concept of realism is founded. He writes. 
If the best men do not draw the great prizes in life; we know it has been so settled 
by the Ordainer of the lottery. W e own, and see daily, how the false and worthless 
live and prosper, while the good are called away, and the dear and young perish 
untimely.—we perceive in every man ' s life the maimed happiness, the frequent 
falling, the bootless endeavour, the struggle of Right and Wrong, in which the 
strong often succumb and the swift fail: we see flowers of good blooming in foul 
places, as. in the most lofty and splendid fortunes, flaws of vice and meanness , 
and stains of evil; and. knowing how mean the best of us is, let us give a hand of 
charity to Arthur Pendennis, with all his faults and shortcomings, who does not 
claim to be a hero, but only a man and a brother. (504) 
The first idea conveyed in this passage is that, since the real world is unfair, fiction 
should emulate its lottery-style distribution of fortune. Directed towards readers who, like 
Lady Rockminster. would have preferred to see a different ending, the narrator 's 
catalogue of life's regular injustices implies that an ending's legitimacy depends on its 
being consistent with reality, not on whether it is emotionally gratifying. 
The second implication is that, though Pen is not the best man in the story, neither 
is he utterly undeserving of our sympathy. Thackeray entreats us to evaluate Pen not as a 
fictional construct whose faults are detailed in print the better for us to condemn him. but 
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as a realistic entity who must not be defined entirely through either his strengths or his 
weaknesses. The necessity of evaluating Pen by realistic s tandards—of maintaining an 
awareness of "how mean the best of us is"—is an idea that recurs throughout the novel. 
In direct addresses to his readers, he repeatedly points out that the criteria by which we 
are inclined to judge the characters in novels would be ludicrously exacting if applied to 
the people whom we encounter in the real world. The narrator engages us most directly 
on the subject of our presumed prejudice in judging Pen when he says, "I would not wish 
to say of poor Arthur Pendennis that he was worse than his neighbours, only that his 
neighbours are bad for the most part. Let us have the candour to own as much at least. 
Can you point out ten spotless men of your acquaintance? Mine is pretty large, but 1 can' t 
find ten saints in the list" (115). The people we know, he suggests, are flawed, and we 
routinely forgive them their faults; therefore, fictional characters, such as Pen, should be 
similarly both flawed and forgiven. 
Thackeray likewise suggests that our attitude towards the probability of certain 
events in fiction is inconsistent with what we are likely to find believable in day-to-day 
life. He supposes, for example, that Laura's passion for Pen might be puzzling to readers 
of conventional novels, in which admirable young women customarily fall in love with 
men of superior qualities. The narrator therefore poses a hypothetical question about this 
subject on behalf of the imagined reader: "Arthur, being so languid, and indifferent, and 
careless about the favours bestowed upon him, how came it that Laura should have such a 
love and rapturous regard for him . . . ? " (352). His answer to the question again demands 
that we compare the situation to similar cases in the real world, rather than to fictional 
tradition: 
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[T]he greatest rascal-cut-throats have had somebody to be fond of them, and if 
those monsters, why not ordinary mortals? And with whom shall a young lady fall 
in love but with the person she sees? She is not supposed to lose her heart in a 
dream, like a Princess in the "Arabian Nights ; ' or to plight her young affections to 
the portrait of a gentleman in the Exhibition, or a sketch in the Illustrated London 
News. You have an instinct within you which inclines you to attach yourself to 
some one . . . . So then Laura liked Pen because she saw scarcely anybody else at 
Fairoaks . . . and because his mother constantly praised her Arthur, and because he 
was gentlemanlike, tolerably good-looking and witty, and because, above all, it 
was of her nature to like somebody. (352) 
Romantic ideals are thus shown to be at the root of the confusion, which is resolved by 
appealing to the commonsense knowledge that we can only love the people we chance to 
know. After all, no deserving young lady in the real world has the benefit of an 
omnipotent narrator to ensure that, in the words of Jane Austen, "Something must and 
will happen to throw a hero in her way" (Northanger Abbey 16). 
In Pendennis, then. Thackeray undermines the convention of the idealized hero by 
replacing him with a flawed protagonist and insisting that we measure the usurper 
charitably, by real-world standards. In Vanity Fair, the strategy of realistic 
characterization is. like everything else in the novel, less straightforward. As with 
Pendennis, our sympathies are divided and problematic; we are presented alternately with 
the good and bad sides of "all the principal characters in this 'Novel without a He ro ' " 
(Vanity Fair 49). Early in the book, the narrator begs leave not only to introduce the 
characters, but also "to step down from the platform, and talk about them: if they are 
good and kindly, to love them and shake them by the hand: if they are silly, to laugh at 
them confidentially in the reader 's sleeve; if they are wicked and heartless, to abuse them 
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in the strongest terms which politeness admits of ' (71). He does provide this promised 
commentary, but not in such a way as to guide us towards uncomplicated assessments of 
them. None of the characters is met exclusively wi th love, laughter, or abuse, but rather 
with different combinations of these responses. Instead of putting us in a position of 
omniscient moral authority, the narrator, with his oscillating sympathies and ambiguous 
reports, forces us to assay characters and situations as we do in life—with uncertainty. 
Despite Thackeray's suggestion that the characters in Vanity Fair are "odious ," he 
does not make wholesale condemnation of them easy. Becky Sharp, Amelia Sedley, 
Rawdon Crawley, Jos Sedley, and even George Osborne are all invested with at least 
some modicum of merit. Becky is no doubt the example foremost in Thackeray 's mind 
when he refers to his characters as "desperately wicked" and "eager after vanit ies" (Letter 
to Robert Bell 67). but even she is not made up merely of unrelieved odiousness. In 
addition to being selfish, deceitful, mercenary, unfaithful, and possibly even murderous, 
she is also, as the narrator points out, funny, clever, good-humoured, and knowledgeable 
about the world (70-71). She is an excellent judge of character and situations, and she 
does not hold grudges. A good example of this is when Dobbin informs her that she is 
"not a fit companion" (651) for Amelia and she nonetheless decides to intercede with 
Amelia on his behalf, thinking, "what a noble heart that man has . . . and how shamefully 
that woman plays with it!" (653). 
Though there is no doubt that Becky 's career is in many ways a sordid one. the 
narrator declines to tell us unequivocally whether she is actually guilty of the two most 
serious charges against her: that of cuckolding her husband with Lord Steyne. and that of 
being responsible for Jos Sedley's death. With respect to the former accusation, the 
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narrative leaves the question of her culpability pointedly hanging: "Was she guilty or 
not? She said not; but who could tell what was truth which came from those lips, or if 
that corrupt heart was in this case pu re?" (517). This conspicuous use of dubitatio draws 
attention to Thackeray 's capricious refusal to play the all-seeing novelist when it comes 
to exposing a crime that could paint a character irretrievably black—though he repeatedly 
notes elsewhere in the book that "The novelist . . . knows everything" (346). By leaving 
the reader unaided in weighing the evidence against Becky, refusing us the traditional 
advantage of omniscience, he reduces our information resources to approximate those 
that we would have at our disposal in judging a real human being. 
Similarly, at the end of the book, when Jos insures his l ife—presumably at 
Becky 's prompting, with her as a beneficiary—and dies three months later, the narrator 
neglects to make any categorical assertion about Becky 's actual role in this dubious 
situation. The solicitor of the insurance company swears that it is "the blackest case that 
ever ha[s] come before h im" (670); however. Becky is acquitted and "her character 
established" (670). As Robert Fletcher observes, "For every piece of evidence of Becky 's 
guilt there is an extenuating circumstance, a sympathetic reading of the incident, or a 
complete displacement of responsibility" (397), and our suspicion of her consummate 
villainy is thus continually undermined. 
In "On Art in Fiction." Bulwer-Lytton advises that "In the delineation of a 
criminal, the author will take care to show us the motives of the crimes—the influences 
beneath which the character has been formed. He will suit the nature of the criminal to 
the state of society in which he is cast" (223). Thackeray, in his characterization of 
Becky, follows this prescription to a tee. Becky is a product of Vanity Fair, her selfish 
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motivations forged in the crucible of a society preoccupied with money, status, and 
surfaces. Poor and alone in the world, she comments at one point that it is easy to be good 
and virtuous if one is rich, and the narrator vouches for the validity of this observation, 
saying, "who knows but Rebecca was right in her speculations, and that it was only a 
question of money and fortune which made the difference between her and an honest 
woman? . . . A comfortable career of prosperity, if it does not make people honest, at least 
keeps them so" (406). Given her disadvantaged background, her sparkling positive 
attributes, and the narrator 's refusal to confirm her delinquency in the matters involving 
Lord Stcyne and Jos Sedley"s death, it is difficult to condemn Becky absolutely. A.E. 
Dyson compares Thackeray 's attitude towards Becky to the way that "one might speak of 
a naughty but not wholly unsympathetic child" (15). and this is an apt description of the 
narrative ambiguity that preserves Becky from the role of conventional villain. 
Similarly, none of the characters in the novel has the consistent nobility of 
purpose necessary to hold our sympathy in the manner of a traditional hero or heroine. 
Thackeray uses the terms "hero" and "heroine*" ironically and whimsically throughout the 
novel, applying them to first one character and then another in order to emphasize his 
flouting of the rule that a novel must have a hero. At one point, for example, the narrator 
archly declares Becky herself to be a heroine. The scene occurs midway through the 
book, when the reader has already had considerable opportunity to become acquainted 
with Becky 's character; we are told, "If this is a novel without a hero, at least let us lay 
claim to a heroine. No man in the British army which has marched away, not the great 
Duke himself, could be more cool or collected in the presence of doubts and difficulties, 
than the indomitable little aide-de-camp's wife" (280). Taken out of context, this 
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statement could be misread as an earnest suggestion that Becky, by virtue of her strength, 
intelligence, and pragmatism, might have some claim to the title of heroine of the novel. 
In light of the nature of the '"doubts and difficulties" in question, however, and the form 
of her "cool and collected" response, Thackeray 's irony in claiming her as such at this 
point in the book is almost deafening. The scene takes place immediately after Becky 's 
husband, Rawdon Crawley, has ridden away to war, and his departure is the occasion for 
one of Becky 's most unsympathetic moments in Vanity Fair. Rawdon ' s obvious love for 
his wife and distress at their parting are contrasted with the callous indifference of Becky 
herself, who, we are told, has "wisely determined not to give way to unavailing 
sentimentality" (279) on the occasion. Instead, she spends the morning calculating how-
much money she will be left with "should circumstances occur" (280) that render her a 
widow, and this cheerful industry of "disposing, ordering, looking out. and locking up her 
properties in the most agreeable manner" (280) is what prompts the narrator 's facetious 
observation about her heroism in the face of adversity. 
Dobbin and Amelia are. respectively, the most likely candidates for the roles of 
hero and heroine, but their claims are also undermined by the oscillating sympathies of 
the text. Though the narrator asserts protectively that Amelia is "a dear little creature" 
and declares that "a great mercy it is. both in life and novels, which (and the latter 
especially) abound in villains of the most sombre sort, that we are to have for a constant 
companion so guileless and good-natured a person" (4), we are also told that she is a 
"weak mother" (443) and a "tender little parasi te" (667) who is "not brilliant, nor witty, 
nor wise overmuch" (373). Protestations of Amel ia ' s worth abound in the text, and she 
does embody far more conventional female virtues than her "sharp" counterpart; 
67 
however, her behaviour in the story often betrays such a foolish and narrow view of the 
world that it is difficult for the reader to identify with her. Her self-destructive obsession 
with the unworthy George Osborne is founded on a wilful blindness to his faults; her 
suffocating love for her son is a selfish and cloying extension of her unhealthy idolatry of 
his father; and her usage of Dobbin, who truly loves her, is ungrateful and shallow. 
Amel ia ' s rejection of Dobbin is founded on his physical unattractiveness. and this 
unworthy motive contributes to Amel ia ' s abasement in the text. The narrator describes 
Dobbin as having "very long legs, a yellow face, and a slight l isp" and goes on to say, 
"He certainly had very large hands and feet, which the two George Osbornes used to 
caricature and laugh at. and their jeers and laughter perhaps led poor little Emmy astray 
as to his worth" (603). When Amelia denounces Dobbin for supposedly insulting the 
memory of her husband, the narrator makes it clear that the alleged slight is not the true 
motive for her attack: 
. . . [W]hat is constancy, or merit? One curl of a girl 's ringlet, one hair of a 
whisker, will turn the scale against them all in a minute. They did not weigh with 
Emmy more than with other women. She had tried them—wanted to make them 
pass—could not—and the pitiless little woman had found a pretext, and 
determined to be free. (650) 
Her rejection of a good man on the grounds of his physical awkwardness, along with her 
devotion to George and his "beautiful black, curling, shining whiskers" (42), 
demonstrates her allegiance to the empty ideals of Vanity Fair. This fault is further 
aggravated by the selfish way in which she seeks to take advantage of Dobbin 's love, 
knowing that she has no intention of returning it: we arc told. "She didn't wish to marry 
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him, but she wished to keep him. She wished to give him nothing, but that he should give 
her al l" (652). 
If Amelia ' s treatment of Dobbin contributes to her discredit, his adulation of her 
constitutes the entire grounds for his. As noted earlier, Thackeray identified Dobbin as 
the only character in the book who does not deserve to be described as odious, and he is 
indeed the figure who comes closest to unadulterated worthiness. The narrator declares 
that Dobbin is a true gentleman, saying, "his thoughts were just , his brains were fairly 
good, his life was honest and pure, and his heart warm and humble" (603); he is adored 
by "All the poor, all the humble, all honest folks, [and] all good men" (654) who know 
him. Despite being a genuinely good man and a thorough gentleman, however, Dobbin ' s 
disproportionate veneration for Amelia disqualifies him from being a hero who 
commands our unmitigated sympathy. Just as Amelia is devalued as a potential heroine 
by her blind passion for George, Dobbin is deflated as an object of our empathy by 
squandering all of his merit, strength, and goodness in pursuit of a woman who does not 
deserve him—and he himself draws our attention to the fact. After Amelia has declared 
that she will never forgive him for insulting George 's memory by suggesting that he was 
unfaithful, Dobbin sadly relinquishes his quest for her heart, telling her "you are not 
worthy of the love which 1 have devoted to you. I knew all along that the prize I had set 
my life on was not worth the winning; that I was a fool, with fond fancies, too, bartering 
away my all of truth and ardour against your little feeble remnant of love" (652). In case 
the reader suspects that Dobbin is being unfairly self-deprecating in his appraisal of the 
situation, the narrator offers support for his position, commenting that "This history has 
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been written to very little purpose if the reader has not perceived that the Major was a 
spooney" (645). 
Thackeray 's ambiguous and shifting attitudes towards his characters thus 
undermine the monolithic categories of protagonist and antagonist, depicting the 
inhabitants of Vanity Fair as realistic figures to be judged with uncertainty. As in 
Pendennis, poetic justice has little influence in determining the outcomes of their 
respective stories; most of the characters are dealt some consolations and some regrets, 
not necessarily in proportion to their merits. By the t ime that Dobbin, for instance, attains 
the goal that is conventionally reserved for "the summit, the end—the last page of the 
third vo lume" and is finally united with "the prize he has been trying for all his life" 
(666-67). the triumphant moment is soured by his prior realization that Amelia is 
unworthy of him and that he has wasted his life in pursuing her. In "Before the Curtain," 
Thackeray's preface to the novel, he writes of his overall creation, 
[T]he general impression is one more melancholy than mirthful. When you come 
home you sit down in a sober, contemplative, not uncharitable frame of mind, and 
apply yourself to your books or your business. 
I have no other moral than this to tag to the present story of "Vanity Fair." (xiv) 
Thus, Thackeray's only moral purpose in the novel is to honestly depict the Vanity Fair 
that he sees in the world around him-—a mishmash of happiness and sadness, virtue and 
vice, which at the end of the day leaves an impression "more melancholy than mirthful." 
Accordingly, he caps the vacillating careers of his characters with a conclusion that 
avoids explicit positive or negative moral sanctions and aims simply, as he writes in his 
letter to Robert Bell, "to leave everybody dissatisfied and unhappy at the end of the 
story" (67). 
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In the preceding pages, I have discussed some of the ways in which Thackeray 
seeks to assert the relative realism of his novels by explicitly contrasting them to more 
conventional, romantic fiction and by encouraging readers to respond to the characters 
and stories as they would to people and episodes in real life. However, this strategy of 
directly addressing the reader in order to draw attention to the mechanisms of realism 
automatically entails an acknowledgment that the fiction at hand—however realistic—is 
fiction. Beyond the consciousness of fictionality that is implicit in any comment on a 
novel ' s relationship to other fiction, Thackeray also incorporates explicit observations on 
the conventions and limitations that the nature of his art forces him to observe, even as he 
mocks their implausibility. His theory of realism, therefore, involves pointing out not 
only the realistic aspects of his tale, but also the artifice and contrivances that are 
necessarily a part of its telling. 
In "The Art of Fiction," Henry James famously criticizes Troll ope ' s use of 
confidential narrative asides to the reader as a "betrayal of a sacred office" (26). arguing 
that the realist author has a responsibility to treat his story as truth, rather than as make-
believe. It is peculiar that James has chosen to launch this accusation against Trollope, 
rather than against Thackeray, whose opinionated narrative presence is far more 
pervasive. Ironically, even Trollope himself argues in his study of Thackeray that his 
fellow wri ter 's "most besetting sin in style" is that he "indulges too frequently in little 
confidences with individual readers" (Thackeray 201). For Thackeray, however, the 
relationship of both writer and reader to the text constitutes an important part of the 
reality that he seeks to represent, and. as George Levine suggests, "The Jamesian attempt 
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to create illusion sufficiently powerful to m a k e us forget we are reading a novel would 
have seemed to [him] misguided'" (142). 
Vanity Fair, in particular, contains frequent allusions to its own status as a 
constructed artefact. Most prominent of these, perhaps, is the puppet-show metaphor that 
surfaces in the preface, entitled '"Before the C u r t a i n " and in the final lines of the book (as 
well as in Thackeray's original illustrations), bracketing and heightening the impact of all 
the intervening episodes of fictional self-consciousness. By picturing himself as the 
"Manager of the Performance" sitting over a devitalized "Becky Puppet." "Amelia Doll."' 
and "Dobbin Figure" ("Before the Curtain" xiv-xv), Thackeray draws attention to his 
own agency in creating the characters and determining the course of the action. When, in 
the concluding sentence of the novel, the narrator declares, "let us shut up the box and the 
puppets, for our play is played out" (671), we are again jarringly reminded that, however 
natural the characters and events of the novel are made to seem—however "uncommonly 
flexible in the joints" ("Before the Curtain" xiv-xv) the puppets may be—they are not an 
extension of reality, but part of a purposefully orchestrated work of imagination. 
Throughout his weaving of the realist tapestry that is Vanity Fair, Thackeray 
plants visible seams for the reader to appreciate. His commentary about the art of 
fabricating a novel includes observations on his active decision-making in matters of 
style, on the necessity of certain plot devices, and on the artifice inherent in his selective 
use of the omniscient narrative perspective. However, while the novel ' s self-awareness is 
intense, it does not penetrate—as it does in Barret t 's The Heroine, for example—into the 
inner reaches of the fiction, where the characters reside and the main action is carried out. 
Rather, the novel 's self-reflexivity is restricted to the level of the narrative occupied by 
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the narrator, that liminal space between story and reader, fiction and reality. Thus, the self 
conscious interludes do not disrupt the realistic progress of the story itself, only our 
experience of it. 
At the beginning of the "Vauxhal l" chapter (chapter 6), for instance, the narrator 
ruminates on the different styles in which the story might have been written. He muses, 
"We might have treated this subject in the genteel, or in the romantic, or in the facetious 
manner" (44), then proceeds with speculations about the sorts of characters and incidents 
that Vanity Fair might have encompassed were it rendered in one of these or various 
other non-realistic styles. Concluding this digression with the assertion that his readers 
must be content with the "homely story" (45) that he has elected to deliver, he 
accordingly returns to the main storyline with a description of an evening outing to the 
Royal Gardens: meanwhile, the characters participating in this outing remain oblivious to 
their own status as imaginary figments controlled by an omnipotent puppet-master. Thus, 
Thackeray reminds us that our perception of the novel ' s action is mediated by his stylistic 
decisions—but the substance of the realist tale itself is preserved intact. 
The author 's manipulating hand is similarly apparent when Becky and Rawdon 
fail to regain the good graces of Miss Crawley, the wealthy aunt who disowns her once-
beloved nephew upon his marriage. As the young couple 's pecuniary difficulties arc 
largely responsible for the course of their participation in the story, the decision to leave 
them penniless is necessary to the plot, and the narrator asserts as much. W e are told that 
Rawdon and Becky are denied Miss Crawley 's forgiveness "doubtless in order that this 
story might be written, in which numbers of their wonderful adventures are narrated— 
adventures which could never have occurred to them if they had been housed and 
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sheltered under the comfortable uninteresting forgiveness of Miss Crawley" (144). Again, 
the credibility of the core narrative is not exactly undermined, as the possibility of being 
disowned is a fact of life as well as of fiction—but at the same time, Thackeray admits 
that even realist texts must be guided by the dictates of good storytelling. 
The use of the selectively omniscient narrator is another example of how 
Thackeray emphasizes the unnatural and mediated quality of our experience of the realist 
narrative. Though sometimes he disclaims the power to know the whole truth about his 
characters, there are other occasions when he reminds us that novelists not only "have the 
privilege of knowing everything" (22), but also have complete control over what we are 
allowed to know. In one of his asides to the reader, he asks: 
If, a few pages back, the present writer claimed the privilege of peeping into Miss 
Amelia Sedley 's bedroom, and understanding with the omniscience of the 
novelist all the gentle pains and passions which were tossing upon that innocent 
pillow, why should he not declare himself to be Rebecca ' s confidant too, master 
of her secrets, and seal-keeper of that young woman ' s confidence? (139) 
The novelist 's ability to whimsically "declare h imse l f" implicitly or otherwise, to be the 
confidant of whichever character he chooses is fundamental to the transfer of information 
between author and reader. The mechanics of storytelling often require that we have 
access to certain information that we could not plausibly have by other means than 
narrative omniscience—for example, knowledge of a character 's internal "pains and 
passions." While there is nothing unrealistic about Amelia ' s and Becky's innermost 
thoughts and feelings in and of themselves. Thackeray 's capacity to provide access to 
them is certainly beyond the scope of what any historian of non-fictional events could 
offer. 
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In addition to drawing attention to the controlling consciousness responsible for 
shaping the naturalistic narrative, Thackeray 's metafictional interludes occasionally 
comment on specific limitations, inherent and otherwise, of fiction that aspires to 
represent reality. One of these has to do with the insufficiency of language to properly 
convey certain scenes. At one point in Pendennis, Pen seeks to comfort a young girl who 
has fallen in love with him, and Thackeray declines to transcribe the "little ejaculations of 
pity and sympathy" (315) that he utters in doing so. These words, he says, 
need not be repeated here, because they would be absurd in print. So would a 
mother 's talk to a child be absurd in print; so would a lover 's to his bride. That 
sweet artless poetry bears no translation: and is too subtle for grammarians ' 
clumsy definitions. You have but the same four letters to describe the salute 
which you perform on your grandmother 's forehead, and that which you bestow 
on the sacred cheek of your mistress; but the same four letters, and not one of 
them a labial. (315) 
Thackeray finds words, the raw material of the wri ter ' s art. to be unequal to his purpose 
for two reasons. The first of these springs from the disparity between spoken and written 
language. As he points out. much of what is actually said in the real world cannot be 
translated into print without compromising the artistic design of a text: in the context of 
the novel, where words are laid down with a degree of care alien to the spontaneous 
exchanges of everyday life, the realistic can easily sound absurd. In his own discussion of 
literary realism. Trollope makes a similar observation about the linguistic compromise 
that the novelist must maintain: 
[I]n very truth the realistic must not be true—but just so far removed from truth as 
to suit the erroneous idea of truth which the reader may be supposed to entertain. 
For were a novelist to narrate a conversation between two persons of fair but not 
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high education, and to use the ill-arranged words and fragments of speech which 
are really common in such conversations, he would seem to have sunk to the 
ludicrous, and to be attributing to the interlocutors a mode of language much 
beneath them. Though in fact true, it would seem to be far from natural. 
(Thackeray 185) 
Ironically, therefore, artifice may in some cases accomplish the goals of realism more 
effectively than genuine realism itself. 
Thackeray's second complaint about language relates to its inadequate potential 
for conveying nuance, both in spoken and written forms. By omitting the word "kiss" 
from his description of the problem, he demonstrates that the shaded meanings of the 
term are almost obscured by the word itself, being more forcefully conveyed by 
circumlocution. His further, playful objection that not one of the letters that make up the 
derided expression is "a labial" also causes the reader to reflect on the notion that the 
relationship between language and the reality it is supposed to represent is arbitrary—the 
lips do not even come into play when we refer to one of their most meaningful actions. 
With such a feeble tool at his disposal as the English language, Thackeray is suggesting, 
he is at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to convey an accurate sense of reality. 
In Vanity Fair, Thackeray also identifies another impediment that realist novels of 
the day faced in attempting to depict the whole truth about the world: the moralistic 
embargo on detailed descriptions of vice. Because Becky 's tale involves a variety of 
offences against propriety, the text delicately avoids going into specifics about many of 
her doings. The need for decorum gives Thackeray occasion to comment on the 
hypocrisy involved in prohibiting novel writers from expounding on subjects that are 
accepted as a matter of course in the real world: 
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We must pass over a part of Mrs. Rebecca Crawley 's biography with that 
lightness and delicacy which the world demands—the moral world, that has, 
perhaps, no particular objection to vice, but an insuperable repugnance to hearing 
vice called by its proper name. There are things we do and know perfectly well in 
Vanity Fair, though we never speak of them—as the Ahrimanians worship the 
devil, but don' t mention him: and a polite public will no more bear to read an 
authentic description of vice than a truly refined English or American female will 
permit the word "breeches ' ' to be pronounced in her chaste hearing. And yet, 
Madam, both are walking the world before our faces every day, without much 
shocking us. (618) 
While Thackeray protests against this perceived discrepancy between what is 
morally acceptable in life and what is morally acceptable in fiction, many critics of his 
time and through the remainder of the nineteenth century maintained that separate 
standards are necessary because the ways that people respond to reality and to fiction are 
fundamentally different. In Vernon Lee ' s 1885 composition "A Dialogue on Novels," for 
example, it is argued that depictions of the vulgar aspects of life are inappropriate 
because a literary work is a distillation of reality presented directly to the intellect to be 
"assimilatefd] . . . into our conscious ideas" (364). Therefore, the argument runs, vulgarity 
in fiction is not justified by a corresponding vulgarity in the world it depicts because 
"fiction is fiction. Because fiction can manipulate things as they are not manipulated by 
reality; because fiction addresses faculties which expect, require, a final summing up, a 
moral, a lesson, a something which will be treasured up, however unconsciously, as a 
generalization" (376). 
As we have seen, Thackeray 's interpretation of realism combines a determination 
to depict everyday life as he sees it with an emphatic awareness of the elements of bias 
and artifice inherent in his work: his earnest portrayal of the world is supplemented by 
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equally earnest observations about the art of narrative. He seeks to cultivate among his 
readers a consciousness of the discrepancy between the standards b y which fictional 
characters and plots and real people and situations are respectively judged. Unlike the 
didactic quixote novelists discussed in the first chapter, however, his interest in the 
relationship between reality and novelistic content is motivated by the aesthetic purpose 
of promoting more rigorous reading and writing practices, rather than by the moral 
purpose of protecting people ' s lifestyles from the influence of fiction. 
At the beginning of this chapter. 1 made reference to the two-pronged nature of 
Thackeray's concern with "humbug": his distaste for the artificial applies as much to the 
real-world Vanity Fair ' s general disregard for truth as it does to implausible literary 
conventions. I have focused on the latter prong up to this point, but. in concluding my 
study of Thackeray, I would like to turn my attention briefly to the first. The reason 
behind Thackeray 's preoccupation with decrying the vanity, falseness, and insincerity 
that he perceives in society is that he is himself a staunch believer in the existence and 
value of certain absolute and fundamental truths—including love, morality, and God. 
Anthony Trollope, in discussing Thackeray's work, staunchly defends his friend against 
charges that he is a cynic by drawing a careful distinction between cynicism and satire. 
Vanity Fair's depiction of the false and wicked aspects of life, Trollope argues, is not 
intended to undermine the idea that people hold the potential to achieve "the true nobility 
which was dear to h im" (Thackeray 95), but rather to fiercely expose the agents that 
corrupt our noble inclinations; therefore, he says, the word "cynic" is "as inappropriate to 
the writer as to the man" (Thackeray 207). Indeed, in his own writing, Thackeray does 
not imply that the odiousncss he seeks to uncover in the characters of the novel is the 
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inevitable state of humanity, but only, to use his own words, of "a set of people living 
without God in the world" (qtd. in Dyson 17). 
Thackeray 's indictment of the view that the world contains no absolute truths is 
most strongly conveyed in the passage of Pendennis that sees Pen defending his own 
newfound scepticism to Warrington. Pen argues that the world contains many layers of 
"truth," which is "changed and modified constantly" (412), subject to development and 
decay. He scoffs at the way that " W e admire this man as being a great philosopher, and 
set down the other as a dullard, not knowing either, or the amount of truth in either, or 
being certain of the truth anywhere" (413). Pen ' s disbelief in the objective validity of 
various religions, philosophies, and moral standards meets with a scornful response on 
the part of his much wiser friend, who declares that he "had rather live in a wilderness of 
monkeys and listen to their chatter, than in a company of men who denied everything" 
(413). At the end of Pen 's disquisition on the indefinite nature of truth, it emerges that the 
whole tirade has been produced in defence of his decision to marry a woman for money 
rather than love: upon this revelation, Warrington exclaims. "This is the meaning of your 
scepticism, of your quietism, of your atheism, my poor fellow. You ' re going to sell 
yourself, and Heaven help you!" (415). Implicit in Warrington 's disapproval of the 
proposition is Thackeray 's own unequivocal belief in the importance of love and the 
immorality of marrying for mercenary reasons, and his position is also made clear when 
the narrator comments deprecatingly, "it will be seen that the lamentable stage to which 
[Pen's] logic at present has brought him, is one of general scepticism and sneering 
acquiescence in the world as it i s" (414). Despite his depictions of the rampant falseness 
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that he perceives in "the world as it i s , " Thackeray is obviously convinced of both the 
existence of objective truth and the importance of pursuing it. 
In contrast, the writer whose ideas will be examined in the next chapter questions 
the existence of a firm division between truth and fiction, suggesting that many elements 
of what people accept as "'reality" are in fact human inventions without any kind of 
objective validity. The aesthetic theories emerging in the late nineteenth century at the 
hands of Oscar Wilde reject altogether the truth-venerating tendency of Thackeray and 
other realists. Instead, they valorize lies, performances, and all other forms of 
fabrication—art, that is to say, for ar t ' s sake. 
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IV . T h e Shifting T r u t h s of Osca r W i l d e 
. . . [T]o him Life itself was the first, the greatest, of the arts, and for it all the 
other arts seemed to be but a preparation. 
-Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray 
Despite the enormous differences in the motivations behind and execution of their 
respective works, Thackeray and the quixote novelists have certain important 
commonalities in their dealings with the relationship between truth and fiction. One of 
these is a shared belief in the existence of an objective reality, or truth; another is the 
tendency to valorize this reality, whether for moral or aesthetic reasons, as the proper 
determinant of literature's subject and style. Oscar Wilde, in stark contrast, rejected these 
notions. In sparkling compositions that frequently substitute sophistry and rhetorical 
pyrotechnics for earnest and logical reasoning, he decries the artistic validity of realism, 
nature, and sincerity. This fin-de-siecle poster child of the aesthetic movement not only 
scoffed at the notion of absolute truth and touted the value of fantasy and artifice as 
literary techniques, he also argued that life itself should be governed according to these 
principles-—as "the first, the greatest, of the arts" (Dorian Gray 94). In this chapter, I will 
describe Wilde ' s convoluted and often paradoxical theories about the nature of truth and 
fiction as they are set forth in the essays and dialogues published collectively under the 
title Intentions in 1891; 1 will then examine the perplexingly contradictory fashion in 
which these theories play out in his only novel. The Picture of Dorian Gray. 
The destabilization of the categories of truth and fiction that runs as a thematic 
current through much of Wilde ' s writing is often reflected in the form of the writings 
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themselves. Many of his texts feature a marked interpenetration of fiction and art 
criticism, illustrating the very indeterminacy of purpose and belief that his theories 
uphold. Two of his major works of criticism, "The Critic as Artist" and "The Decay of 
Lying." are structured as dialogues between fictional characters (Gilbert and Ernest in the 
former, and Cyril and Vivian in the latter), one of whom expounds theories about art 
while the other serves as a critical sounding board. By expressing his own aesthetic 
arguments through a dual fictional mouthpiece, Wilde introduces an element of 
uncertainty into our reading of his intentions and demonstrates his preference, examined 
more closely later in this chapter, for changeable poses rather than firm stances. 
Accordingly, Lawrence Danson understands Wilde ' s use of the dialogue form as a 
technique that allows him to "take up and put down the masks" (37) by which he can rise 
above the dull monotony of human nature. On a practical level, the argument that truth is 
relative and transient is not best served by locking oneself into an unequivocal theoretical 
position, and, as Julia Prewitt Brown writes in Cosmopolitan Criticism: Oscar Wilde's 
Philosophy of Art. Wi lde ' s use of the dialogue also implicitly suggests "that truth itself is 
contradictoriness" (93). 
This blurring of the boundaries between the genres of fiction and criticism is also 
visible in Wilde ' s narrative prose. For example, the short story "The Portrait of Mr. W. 
H." embeds an elaborate theoretical reading of Shakespeare 's sonnets into a tale about an 
art forgery. Likewise, Dorian Gray is centrally concerned with questions about the nature 
and influence of art and fiction. In a letter to the editor of the Scots Observer, Wilde 
himself describes his novel as "an essay on decorative art." explaining that "It reacts 
against the crude brutality of plain real ism" (247). Whether or not this concise summary 
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of the novel 's purpose is entirely accurate or comprehensive, there is no doubt that the 
exploration of aesthetic theory forms a large part of its agenda. 
The genre-bending quality of Wilde 's fiction-framed criticism is the practical 
extension of one of his central arguments in "The Critic as Artist": that there is, in fact, 
no division between the creative and the critical faculties. "The antithesis between them," 
he writes, "is entirely arbitrary. Without the critical faculty, there is no artistic creation at 
all, worthy of the name." He goes on to explain that "there is no fine art without self-
consciousness and self-consciousness and the critical spirit are one" ("The Critic as 
Artist" 832). Beyond undermining the distinction between fictional and non-fictional 
modes of writing, this identification of creativity with "self-consciousness and the critical 
spirit" hints at a broader argument regarding the processes of understanding and self-
definition through which individuals build their lives and identities. A person 's critical 
faculties are employed daily in evaluating and responding to the people, events, and 
situations that he comes across in the real world. By equating self-consciousness, 
criticism, and art, Wilde plants the germ of the idea that the wilful evolution of a self-
conscious and intellectually active individual results in something much akin to a work of 
art. 
The Essays and Dialogues 
As 1 have suggested above. Wilde 's essays and dialogues outline a vision of the 
relationship between fiction and reality that is largely a reversal of the views expounded 
by Thackeray and the quixote novelists. In the quixote novels, the confusion of the realms 
of fantasy and reality is fraught with absurdity at best and danger at worst; inevitably. 
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these texts conclude by reasserting the boundaries between life and fiction, restoring the 
erring quixote figure, much chastened, to her "real" self. Thackeray, while recognizing 
that fictitious or affected attitudes and poses are a very real part of society itself, deplores 
this proliferation of artifice. In both cases, reality, with its correlates of honesty, sincerity, 
and truth, is regarded as the gold standard of moral and aesthetic value—and fiction, 
associated with falseness, insincerity, and lies, is admired mainly in proportion to its 
realism. From the Wildean perspective, however, beauty, rather than mundane truth, is 
the highest ideal, and the greatest beauty results from the deliberate creation of 
aesthetically pleasing form, which is alien to nature. Thus, in Wi lde ' s theories, artifice 
(which "The Decay of Lying" proudly and pointedly acclaims by its most pejorative 
name) supplants nature as the ultimate good. 
At the most basic level, Wi lde ' s enthusiasm for the patently invented manifests 
itself in his staunchly anti-realist philosophy of fiction. The rejection of literary realism 
forms a major vein of "The Critic as Artist." and it constitutes the very foundation of 
"The Decay of Lying": in discussing the latter, Lawrence Danson comments that the 
question of realism is "the contemporary polemical context in which the essay has to be 
understood" (47). By the late nineteenth century, realism was firmly entrenched as the 
predominant mode of the novel, and Wilde ' s views represent a departure from the status 
quo. In the same way that the opinions of early- to mid-century, pro-realist theorizers 
emerged in response to the heyday of romanticism, Wilde ' s critical stances are rooted in 
a backlash against the success enjoyed by the realist movement. In "The Decay of 
Lying," Vivian, who acts as the major representative of Wilde himself, says that he hopes 
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his article will prompt "a new renaissance of art" (778), and he begins his argument by-
explaining why such a rebirth is necessary. 
Vivian takes as his starting point the type of thinking exemplified by the theories 
of Henry James, Wi lde ' s contemporary and critical opposite. James provides an extreme 
statement of the realist doctrine in his essay "The Art of Fiction," asserting that "The only 
reason for the existence of a novel is that it does attempt to represent life" (25). In 
Vivian ' s assessment, "The loss that results to literature in general from this false ideal of 
our t ime can hardly be overestimated" (779). The consequence of the widely felt 
imperative to take the subject-matter of fiction directly from life, he argues, is that "the 
modern novelist provides us with dull facts under the guise of fiction" (779). Vivian (and, 
by extension. Wilde) thus characterizes realism as an unwelcome intrusion of the actual 
into the rightful territory of the fantastic. In "The Critic as Artist ," the Wilde-figure 
named Gilbert reiterates this rejection of reality as a suitable subject for fiction, 
explaining that "Whatever actually occurs is spoiled for art . . . . To be natural is to be 
obvious, and to be obvious is to be inartistic" (865). According to Wilde, therefore, 
insight, innovation, and the expression of the unexpected are the legitimate goals of art. 
As Vivian summarizes bluntly, "All bad art comes from returning to life and nature, and 
elevating them into ideals . . . . As a method Realism is a complete failure" ("D of L" 798-
99). 
A further notion about the appropriate origins of artistic inspiration that surfaces 
in both "The Decay of Lying" and "The Critic as Artist" is the idea that art should draw 
and expand upon matter already ensconced in the artistic tradition. "The proper school to 
learn art in is not life but art" ("D of L" 787), says Vivian, and Gilbert elaborates that 
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"The great artists, from Homer and Aeschylus, down to Shakespeare and Keats, did not 
go directly to life for their subject-matter, but sought for it in myth, and legend, and 
ancient ta le" ("C as A " 839). This argument relates to the major reason for Wilde 's 
objection to the realist enterprise of imitating life, which is that the unrefined materials of 
life and nature lack aesthetic form and. consequently, are deficient in beauty and 
meaning. Elements appropriated from literary sources, Wilde suggests, are useful to the 
artist because in them the rough stuff of reality has already been translated into artistic 
convention ("D of L" 798-99); the imaginative medium has imbued the vulgar and 
formless with elegance and significance. 
In an 1884 article, Robert Louis Stevenson writes. "The novel which is a work of 
art exists, not by its resemblances to life, which arc forced and material . . . but by its 
immeasurable difference from life, which is designed and significant, and is both the 
method and the meaning of the work" ("A Humble Remonst rance" 345). This critique of 
realism describes the characteristic of art that, in Wi lde ' s mind, is the quality that makes 
imaginative artistic products superior not only to realistic art. but also to reality itself: 
form. Throughout the dialogues, Wilde repeats the idea that art. by virtue of its 
consciously instilled form, is "more marvellous, more enduring, and more true than the 
world that common eyes look upon" ("C as A " 838). True aesthetic satisfaction, he feels, 
is derived from that which departs from the natural in, to use Stevenson's words, a 
"designed and significant" fashion. 
According to Wilde, nature itself is displeasing on an aesthetic level because it 
fails to be meaningful in a way that appeals to our intellectual sense of beauty. This 
argument is most explicitly delivered in "The Critic as Artist" when Gilbert declares. 
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"Life! Life! Don ' t let us go to life for our fulfilment or our experience. It is a thing 
narrowed by circumstances, incoherent in its utterance, and without that fine 
correspondence of form and spirit which is the only thing that can satisfy the artistic and 
critical temperament" (851). Wilde thus suggests that, relative to art, which the mind 
designs in accordance with the demands of its own sensibilities and under conditions 
unfettered by the shackles of circumstance and possibility, nature appears fatally 
imperfect. His "artistic and critical temperament" craves a "correspondence of form and 
spiri t"—which may be understood as the combination of a conscious purpose with the 
perfect expression of that purpose—that is simply not present in the arbitrary unfolding 
of life. In its carefully distilled and coherently stylized impressions of life, therefore, art 
provides a potent alternative to lived experience. As evidence of this power. Gilbert 
alludes to "books that can make us live more in one single hour than life can make us live 
in a score of shameful years" ("C as A " 850), and elsewhere he notes: 
After playing Chopin, 1 feel as if 1 had been weeping over sins that I had never 
committed, and mourning over tragedies that were not my own. . . . I can fancy a 
man who had led a perfectly commonplace life, hearing by chance some curious 
piece of music, and suddenly discovering that his soul, without his being 
conscious of it. had passed through terrible experiences, and known fearful joys , 
or wild romantic loves, or great renunciations. ("C as A " 823) 
"The Decay of Lying" also visits the idea that reality, in its uncultured 
amorphousness, is inferior to the smartly fashioned and purposeful realm of art. In his 
opening lines, Vivian asserts baldly, "What art really reveals to us is nature 's lack of 
design, her curious crudities, her extraordinary monotony, her absolutely unfinished 
condit ion. . . . Art is our spirited protest, our gallant attempt to teach nature her proper 
place" ("D of L" 777). Wilde thus positions art as being prior to nature in our 
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comparative perceptions; where Thackeray and others take reality as the central standard 
against which art is measured, Wilde reverses the two. Throughout the dialogues, rather 
than reading art as a derivative of reality, he critiques reality as a failed aspirant to the 
status of art. 
Due to its lack of innate form, therefore, unspoiled nature strikes Wilde as a 
thorough aesthetic failure. The dialogues do, however, provide for the possibility of its 
redemption by suggesting that the human intellect has the means to impose pleasing, 
artificial form upon life: through language, through postures, and through art-influenced 
modes of perception. Thus, life has the potential to rank alongside literature as one of 
"the two supreme and highest ar ts" ("C as A " 828) when a creative will applies itself to 
shaping the raw material provided by nature. Wilde writes. "The longer one studies life 
and literature, the more strongly one feels that behind everything that is wonderful stands 
the individual, and that it is not the moment that makes the man. but the man who creates 
the age" (833). In referring to "the age," a quantity that encompasses all the transient, 
artificial trappings that demarcate the different phases of mankind ' s existence, Wilde 
evokes an aspect of reality that is undeniably a human invention. Further, he suggests that 
the spirit of the age is derived from the artistic creations that influence people ' s behaviour 
and their perceptions of the world—from visual art. literature, and especially language, 
which is "the parent, and not the child, of thought" ("C as A " 834). As Gilbert declares, 
"Find expression for a sorrow, and it will become dear to you. Find expression for a joy . 
and you intensify its ecstasy. Do you wish to love? Use Love ' s Litany, and the words will 
create the yearning from which the world fancies that they spring" ("C as A " 865). Thus, 
the idea that artistic innovation inaugurates corresponding changes in the reality of those 
88 
exposed to art is at the root of Wi lde ' s famous statement that "Paradox though it may 
seem .. . life imitates art far more than art imitates life" ("D of L" 789). 
The two strands of his argument in support of this stance relate, respectively, to 
the imitative instincts of human beings and the role played by individual perception in 
defining reality. He suggests that "the true disciples of the great artist are not his studio-
imitators, but those who become like his works of art" ("D of L" 790) by consciously or 
unconsciously patterning their behaviour after literary models. The basis of life, he 
argues, "is simply the desire for expression, and art is always presenting various forms 
through which the expression can be attained" ("D of L" 792). The examples that Wilde 
brings forward to illustrate his point range from the reasonable, to the intensely dubious, 
to the entirely fabricated. An example that falls into the first category is his reference to 
young boys who are inspired by the shenanigans of fictitious youths to "pillage the stalls 
of unfortunate apple-women, break into sweet-shops at night, and alarm old gentlemen ... 
by leaping out on them in suburban lanes, with black masks and unloaded revolvers" ("D 
of L" 790). Credulity is more strained by his suggestion that Hamlet invented "the 
pessimism that characterises modern thought" and "The world has become sad because a 
puppet was once melancholy" ("D of L" 790). His story about a friend named "Mr. 
Hyde" who finds himself caught up in a precise re-enactment of the opening scene of 
Stevenson's novel is manifestly not true—but, Vivian says, "it should have been" ("D of 
L" 791). 
Cyril. Vivian 's attentive listener, concedes that people ' s lives may follow patterns 
ordained by artistic precedent and defies him to demonstrate that nature does the same. 
Declaring himself to be "prepared to prove anything" ("D of L" 793), Vivian develops 
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his argument around the idea that nature imitates art because our experience of reality is 
defined b y our perceptions: "what is nature? . . . She is our creation. It is in our brain that 
she quickens to life. Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see 
it, depends on the arts that have influenced us. To look at a thing is very different from 
seeing a thing" ("D of L" 793). The distinction that Wilde draws between looking and 
seeing is at the heart of his reasoning here, gesturing to the division between the actual 
physical objects and phenomena that exist in nature and our experience of these objects 
and phenomena. The reality that he is interested in is not that of nature as it may exist 
outside of human perception, which seems to him crude and irrelevant; it consists rather 
of the world as it presents itself to the intellect. In the following passage, Vivian 
illustrates the importance of seeing—that is. of physical perception tempered by critical 
consciousness—in defining our reality: 
At present, people see fogs, not because there are fogs, but because poets and 
painters have taught them the mysterious loveliness of such effects. There may 
have been fogs for centuries in London. I dare say there were. But no one saw 
them, and so we do not know anything about them. They did not exist till art had 
invented them. . . . Where the cultured catch an effect, the uncultured catch cold. 
("D of L " 793) 
In his essay "Art, Life and Reality," David Novitz suggests that Wilde is 
inconsistent in this discussion of the London fogs, wavering back and forth on the 
question of whether objects exist regardless of whether or not we perceive them (Novitz 
303). He also accuses him of being "unable to divorce his more innocuous 
epistemological claims about art (namely, that it influences our perception and shapes our 
behaviour) from the bolder, more strident, metaphysical claim that art is the source and 
causal origin of everything." Wilde, Novitz continues, "hopelessly overstates his case by 
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contending that it [art] is causally responsible for everything" (304). It seems, however, 
that Novi tz ' s criticism springs at least partly from his having overlooked Wi lde ' s 
carefully drawn distinction between looking and seeing, and that his reading of the 
flippant, hyperbolic flourishes that abound in Wilde ' s writing is too literal. In order for 
Vivian 's argument to make sense, we must realize that there are two simultaneous orders 
of reality in question here, exemplified by the physical fogs (looked at but not seen), 
which inflict colds on the uncultured, and the impressionistic fogs that are seen when 
nature comes to the attention of a cultured consciousness. It is the latter form of reality 
that holds significance for the aesthete. Wilde clearly acknowledges that unperceived 
fogs are real enough to exert palpable effects, but the reality that he is interested in is that 
which "'quickens to life" in the mind. Nature undeniably exists, plodding reliably along 
without relevance, but it does not exist in any important sense until human thought 
imposes some form of meaning upon it. When understood in these terms, Wi lde ' s 
argument may remain highly debatable, but it is not the rhetorical failure that Novitz 
suggests. 
Because of the role played by perception in determining reality as it exists for the 
individual mind, Wilde conceives of this reality as a variable and relative thing. 
According to the dialogues, there is no such thing as absolute truth either in life or in art. 
only artistic and moral standpoints. Any approach to viewing or structuring one ' s reality 
is therefore legitimate, provided that it imposes some kind of form and meaning on life. 
In choosing an attitude or stance to adopt, sincerity and genuine conviction are 
immaterial. A pose is simply "a formal recognition of the importance of treating life from 
a definite and reasoned standpoint" ("C as A " 855), and, given the indeterminate nature 
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of truth, n o such standpoint is more correct than any other. Correctness is not at issue; 
Wi lde ' s goal is to bend reality into an aesthetically satisfying form and style. 
His disregard for the notion of objective truth is reinforced in the essays and 
dialogues by repeated arguments against the value of consistency in criticism or 
elsewhere. According to "The Critic as Artist,'" the true critic will "always be sincere in 
his devotion to the principle of beauty,"' but he "will never suffer himself to be limited to 
any settled custom of thought or stereotyped mode of looking at th ings" (861). No single 
critical stance is more valid than any other; rather, "each mode of criticism is, in its 
highest development, simply a mood, and . . . we are never more true to ourselves than 
when we are inconsistent" ("C as A " 859). Thus, the inconsistent and self-contradictory 
critic is more honest in his stance than he who supports a single, coherent view, because 
multiplicity is the closest approximation of truth. Caprice and flamboyant insincerity are 
represented as a laudable alternative to the more unimaginative and hypocritical practice 
of endorsing one arbitrarily chosen belief above all others. Accordingly. Gilbert argues 
that the true critic "will not consent to be the slave of his own opinions" and that "What 
people call insincerity is simply a method by which we can multiply our personalit ies" 
(861). Vivian of "The Decay of Lying" agrees, saying, "Who wants to be consistent? The 
dullard and the doctrinaire, the tedious people who carry out their principles to the bitter 
end of action, to the reductio ad absurdum of practice. Not 1. Like Emerson, 1 write over 
the door of my library the word 'Whim'" ' (778). 
In accordance with this sentiment, Wilde concludes his essay "The Truth of 
Masks" with a resounding declaration that he is not above carrying out his principles 
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regarding inconsistency. After arguing at length in favour of staging Shakespeare 's plays 
with careful attention to the historicity of costumes and sets, he writes: 
Not that 1 agree with everything that 1 have said in this essay. There is much with 
which 1 entirely disagree. The essay simply represents an artistic standpoint, and 
in aesthetic criticism attitude is everything. For in art there is no such thing as a 
universal truth. A truth in art is that whose contradictory is also t rue . . . . The truths 
of metaphysics are the truths of masks. (893) 
As Lawrence Danson points out in Wilde's Intentions, "the retraction is not just a witty 
formal gesture: it states a real fact. Between the publication of the essay in its original 
form as 'Shakespeare and Stage Costume ' (Nineteenth Century, May 1885) and revision 
for Intentions in 1891, Wilde had changed his mind, or reshuffled his t e rms" (60). Indeed. 
"The Truth of Masks" was published in Intentions alongside "The Decay of Lying," 
which argues explicitly and contrarily that art has no responsibility to be historically 
accurate ("D o f L " 794-796). 
The indeterminacy that Wilde identifies as being the proper state of criticism 
extends also to other areas that are customarily viewed in terms of absolutes. On the 
subject of morality, he writes. "Virtues! Who knows what virtues are? Not you. Not I. 
Not anyone" ("C as A " 846). and on the subject of religion, "The Creeds are believed, not 
because they are rational, but because they are repeated. Yes; form is everything. It is the 
secret of life." ("C as A " 865). Unlike Thackeray, who argues that objective and 
definable truths do exist, Wilde professes to understand reality as an irreducibly 
multifarious quantity, from which society arbitrarily selects particular instances to exalt 
as truth. Thus, he writes, "To know the truth one must imagine myriads of falsehoods. 
For what is truth? In matters of religion, it is simply the opinion that has survived. In 
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matters of science, it is the ultimate sensation. In matters of art, it is one ' s last mood" ("C 
as A " 860). 
The Picture of Dorian Gray 
Read as an extension of Wilde 's theoretical writings, The Picture of Dorian Gray 
is something of a paradox. While it contains and illustrates many of the same ideas about 
art that are present in the dialogues, these ideas are largely undermined by the overall 
tendency of the story itself. In particular, his claims about the indeterminate nature of 
truth, especially in matters relating to morality, are brought into question by the novel ' s 
dispensation of definite moral sanctions. The book ' s preface asserts that "There is no 
such thing as a moral or an immoral book" and goes on to say, "No artist has ethical 
sympathies. An ethical sympathy in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of style" 
(vii). However, these claims are incongruously affixed to a novel with an unmistakeable 
moral. Dorian Gray tells the tale of a man who carries Wilde ' s own theories about life 
and art to a lived extreme—and, disconcertingly enough, it frames the result as a horror 
story. 
In some respects, the novel is perfectly consistent with its author 's professed 
critical beliefs. In accordance with his anti-realist criticism, his appreciation for 
traditional literary paradigms, and his view that "The supreme pleasure in literature is to 
realise the non-existent" (Letter to the editor of the St James's Gazette 240). Wilde has 
fashioned in Dorian Gray a fantastic incarnation of the Faust legend. The young Dorian 
is captivated by the beauty of a portrait painted of him by his friend Basil Hallward. 
Under the influence of Lord Henry Wotton. who preaches a Wiklean creed of amoral 
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individualism and the supremacy of art and beauty, Dorian reflects aloud that he would 
give his soul in order to remain young while the portrait grows old in his stead. Over the 
course of the following years, as Dorian is moulded by the will of Lord Henry into a 
living work of art and immerses himself in a career of dissipation, the picture becomes 
increasingly aged and hideous while Dorian remains perpetually unmarred by the ravages 
of time or sin. Ultimately, Dorian seeks to destroy the portrait and its evidence of his 
iniquitous life; however, as he plunges a knife into the canvas, he assumes his rightful 
loathsome appearance, and the portrait is restored to its original perfection. The subject of 
the novel thus belongs squarely to the realm of gothic fantasy, rather than to the realistic 
mode that Wilde scorns. 
The critical themes of Dorian Gray are also consistent with those of the dialogues 
in that the narrator occasionally espouses theories and observations that might have been 
lifted directly from those very writ ings—and which, in some cases, duplicate them almost 
verbatim. This shift into the opinionated narrative voice is typically marked by a 
corresponding shift into the universalizing, present tense used in essay writing. At one 
point, for instance, the narrator describes fashion as that "by which what is really 
fantastic becomes for a moment universal" (94). This statement reflects the idea that the 
barrier between what is fantastic and what is real is far from impermeable, and that art 
really does govern life. The narrative departs on a more substantial tangent into Wi lde ' s 
own critical meanderings when it comments that civilized society 
feels instinctively that manners are of more importance than mora ls . . . . For the 
canons of good society are, or should be, the same as the canons of art. Form is 
absolutely essential to it. It should have the dignity of a ceremony, as well as its 
unreality, and should combine the insincere character of a romantic play with the 
wit and beauty that make such plays delightful to us. Is insincerity such a terrible 
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thing? I think not. It is merely a method by which we can multiply our 
personalities. (104) 
This passage not only expresses Wilde ' s accustomed preoccupation with the importance 
of imposing form upon life, it does so using almost exactly the same words as "The Critic 
as Artist ." 3 Interestingly, following this pointed delving into the thoughts of the narrative 
or authorial " I , " Wilde immediately moves to disown the comments by writing. "Such, at 
any rate, was Dorian Gray 's opinion" (104). This strange introduction of uncertainty to 
what begins as a bold assertion of one of Wilde 's favourite views hints at the 
inconsistency that characterizes the relationship between the critical writings and Dorian 
Gray. 
One of the perplexing features of the novel is the role played in it by Lord Henry 
Wotton. Of the characters in the novel, he represents the nearest embodiment of Wi Ide­
as-critic, spouting countless theories and epigrams of the variety found in the essays and 
dialogues. Like Vivian and Gilbert, he advocates posing, inconsistency, and form, and he 
denies the existence of objective truths. However, given Henry 's position in the story, his 
endorsement of these critical and philosophical propositions hardly comes across as 
sound evidence of their validity. As the instigator of Dorian 's fatal pledge and his fall 
into dissipation. Lord Henry (or "Harry." as he is. significantly, called by Dorian) 
unmistakcably acts the part of the devil figure in the Faust paradigm—the most dubious 
source of information imaginable. 
J
 Compare the final lines of this excerpt to the passage cited earlier from "The Critic as Artist," which 
reads, "What people call insincerity is simply a method by which we can multiply our personalities" (861). 
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As befits the fictional incarnation of Wilde ' s critical persona, Henry is the 
consummate poseur. At the beginning of the novel, Basil Hall ward says to him. "You 
never say a moral thing, and you never do a wrong thing. Your cynicism is simply a 
pose"' (4). Henry 's aunt echoes this sentiment later in the book, when she comments to a 
friend, "He never means anything that he says" (28). Indeed, Henry ' s activities in the 
novel consist of a great deal of clever talk and no corresponding action; he is certainly not 
one of those "tedious people" derided in "The Decay of Lying" for carrying out their 
principles "to the reductio ad absurdum of practice"' ("D of L" 778). His ideas, in 
accordance with Wi lde ' s idea of truly artistic criticism, are as brilliantly rendered as they 
are shallow, insincere, and transient. In the following passage, Wilde describes how, 
through a dazzling display of sophistry, Henry impresses his lunch companions by 
transforming a ludicrous epigram—the idea that "To get back one ' s youth, one has 
merely to repeat one ' s follies" (30)—into an almost credible philosophy of life: 
He played with the idea, and grew wilful; tossed it into the air and transformed it; 
let it escape and recaptured it: made it iridescent with fancy and winged it with 
paradox. The praise of folly, as he went on, soared into a philosophy, and 
Philosophy herself became young, and catching the mad music of Pleasure . . . 
danced like a Bacchante over the hills of life, and mocked the slow Silenus for 
being sober. Facts fled before her like frightened forest things. (30) 
This bravura performance involves precisely the kind of insincerity, artistic flair, and 
disregard for truth that Vivian applauds in "the temper of the true liar, with his frank, 
fearless statements, his superb irresponsibility, his healthy, natural disdain of proof of any 
kind" ("D of L" 778). When one of Henry's lunch companions asks him if he means 
everything that he has said. Henry replies that he has quite forgotten it all (DG 31). Later, 
he summarily expresses his disregard for constancy of every kind when he says. 
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"Faithfulness is to the emotional life what consistency is to the life of the intellect— 
simply a confession of failure" (36). 
He also shares Vivian 's and Gilbert 's views about art 's general superiority to life 
and the importance of form in generating meaning. At one point, Dorian quotes one of 
Henry ' s maxims on the subject to Basil, saying, "If one doesn't talk about a thing, it has 
never happened. It is simply expression, as Harry says, that gives reality to th ings" (79). 
This assertion is reminiscent of Vivian 's ruminations on the London fogs in "The Decay 
of Lying." Similarly. Henry 's argument that people are naturally more moved by a Greek 
tragedy than by a real death because "the real tragedies of life occur in such an inartistic 
manner that they hurt us by their crude violence, their absolute incoherence, their absurd 
want of meaning, their entire lack of s tyle" (73) is a pseudo-logical extension of the 
observations made by Vivian and Gilbert about life's unappealing lack of design. 
Lord Henry 's opinions about the non-existence of an objective, external morality 
also parallel the views contained in the dialogues. These ideas are central to the 
contradiction that exists between Dorian Gray and the dialogues, because Dorian 's 
punishment ultimately implies that distinct categories of good and evil do exist. 
According to Lord Henry, however, moral standards are merely artificial constructs of a 
particular t ime and place, and that the highest good in fact comes of an individual 's being 
in harmony with his own desires. "Modern morality consists in accepting the standard of 
one 's age ," he says, and he goes on to argue that "for any man of culture to accept the 
standard of his age is a form of the grossest immorali ty" (57). Thus, he encourages 
Dorian to reject "the false ideals of our age" (16) in favour of a "new Hedonism" (17), 
and to follow his every whim with no regard for conventional morality, giving "form to 
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every feeling, expression to every thought, [and] reality to every dream" (13). Lord 
Henry 's advice is strikingly similar in spirit to a passage spoken by Gilbert in "The Critic 
as Artist": 
What is termed sin is an essential element of progress. Without it the world would 
stagnate, or grow old, or become colourless. By its curiosity sin increases the 
experience of the race. Through its intensified assertion of individualism, it saves 
us from monotony of type. In its rejection of the current notions about morality, it 
is one with the higher ethics. (835) 
The speciousness of Lord Henry ' s various opinions—many of which, as we have 
seen, are also central to Wilde 's other writings—is not implied merely by Dorian 's final 
downfall. On several occasions in the novel, Henry 's most ardent follower, Dorian 
himself, describes Henry ' s influence as a seductive but nefarious factor in his life, 
referring to his arguments as "wrong, fascinating, poisonous, delightful theories" (56). 
Later, at the point in the novel when Dorian is closest to redemption, he makes the 
following resolution: "He would not see Lord Henry any more—would not. at any rate, 
listen to those subtle poisonous theories that in Basil Hal lward 's garden had first stirred 
within him the passion for impossible th ings" (67). Given the proximity between Henry 's 
and Wilde ' s respective theories on a number of issues, the use of words such as "wrong." 
"poisonous," and " impossible" in descriptions of Lord Henry ' s ideas confirms the deep 
uneasiness that exists in the relationship between Dorian Gray and the more theoretical 
works in the Wildean canon. 
While Lord Henry plays the role of diabolical aesthetic theorist, Dorian Gray-
serves as the empirical test case for his theories. Not only is Dorian himself presented as 
a living work of art, shaped by Lord Henry ' s influence, but he adopts to a practical 
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extreme his mentor ' s notions about the superiority of art over life. His inordinate 
devotion to art manifests itself first in a passionate love affair with a young 
Shakespearean actress named Sybil Vane and then in his destructive fascination with a 
book lent to him by Lord Henry. 
Dorian's infatuation with Sybil Vane begins when he sees her playing in a dingy 
London theatre 's production of Romeo and Juliet. Steeped in Lord Henry ' s influence, he 
has internalized the Wildean view that literary constructs are "more marvellous, more 
enduring, and more t rue" ("C as A" 838) than any product of the real world and is 
captivated by the possibility of possessing in life one who embodies, chameleon-like, the 
superior aesthetic form of countless fictional heroines. Confessing his passion to Henry, 
Dorian comments that, while "Ordinary women never appeal to one ' s imagination" (37), 
Sibyl "is all the great heroines of the world in one. She is more than an individual" (40). 
From the beginning, therefore, he loves her because her talent as an actress allows the 
real Sibyl Vanc to be subsumed in the fictitious roles she plays. Glorying in the way that 
she brings works of art to life, Dorian exults, "Lips that Shakespeare taught to speak have 
whispered their secret in my ear. I have had the arms of Rosalind around me , and kissed 
Juliet on the mouth" (55). 
Thus, when Sibyl 's new-found love awakens her to the vibrancy of life and. 
consequently, dulls her acting ability. Dorian 's interest in her vanishes instantly. 
Informing her that he loved her because she "realized the dreams of great poets and gave 
shape and substance to the shadows of art" (63), and that without her art she is nothing, 
he breaks their engagement. Later that night, she kills herself. When Lord Henry visits 
Dorian the next day and tells him of her death, he counters Dor ian ' s feelings of grief and 
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remorse with renewed assurances that Sibyl 's life was worth far less than her art. He 
says, "'Mourn for Ophelia, if you like. Put ashes on your head because Cordelia was 
strangled. Cry out against Heaven because the daughter of Brabantio died. But don' t 
waste your tears over Sibyl Vane. She was less real than they are" (75). Cheered by 
Henry 's insistence that Sibyl 's mundane life was meaningless outside its relationship to 
art, Dorian resolves that when he thinks of her. it will be as "a wonderful tragic figure 
sent on to the wor ld ' s stage to show the supreme reality of Love" (77). 
In this way. Dorian consoles himself by denying the importance that is 
conventionally placed on human life. Instead, he embraces an extreme interpretation of 
the idea that art is more significant than life. Despite the fact that this belief in art 's pre­
eminence is a staple of Wilde 's aesthetic philosophy. Dorian 's dealings with Sybil Vane 
are by no means validated by the text. To the contrary, it is when he rejects the real Sybil, 
divested of the alluring veil of her art, that the fateful portrait first betrays traces of 
cruelty about the mouth (66). In a fashion that seems calculated to undermine one of 
Wilde ' s favourite maxims, therefore. Dorian's horrific downward spiral is effectively 
initiated by his excessive regard for art and corresponding disdain for reality. 
The events of the second half of Dorian Gray are largely motivated by another 
instance of Dorian 's moulding of life to suit his artistic sensibilities: his compulsive 
imitation of the actions and ideas contained in a "poisonous book" (DG 92) lent to him by-
Lord Henry. The significance of this book 4 to Wilde ' s overall treatment of the 
relationship between fiction and reality is twofold. Firstly, the subject of the book is 
closely related to Lord Henry 's (and Wilde ' s own) argument that all human values, 
4
 Dorian's "poisonous book" was identified by Wilde during his trial as Karl Huysmans" A Rebours (1884), 
a major text of the Decadent movement (Hyde 130). 
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beliefs, and passions are artificial, arbitrary, and transient, fit to be tried on and discarded 
at will. The following passage describes its nature: 
It was a novel without a plot, and with only one character, being, indeed, simply a 
psychological study of a certain young Parisian, who spent his life trying to 
realize in the nineteenth century all the passions and modes of thought that 
belonged to every century except his own. and to sum up, as it were, in himself 
the various moods through which the world-spirit had ever passed, loving for their 
mere artificiality those renunciations that men have unwisely called virtue, as 
much as those natural rebellions that wise men still call sin. (91) 
Experimenting indiscriminately with various forms, postures, and moods, the young 
Parisian is a figure consistent with Wilde ' s description in "The Critic as Artist" of the 
true aesthetic adventurer, who, "constant only to the principle of beauty in all things, will 
ever be looking for fresh impressions, winning from the various schools the secret of 
their charm, bowing, it may be, before foreign altars, or smiling, if it be his fancy, at 
strange new gods" ("C as A " 859). Through continual posturing, he frees himself from 
the monotonous bounds of a constant, natural character, in a way that is heartily 
advocated by the dialogues. 
The second thematic function of Dorian 's involvement with this book is to 
illustrate Wilde ' s contention, expressed in "The Decay of Lying." that living reflections 
of fictional types are "simply the inevitable result of life's imitative instinct" ("D of L" 
790). "For years." the narrator informs us. "Dorian Gray could not free himself from the 
influence of this book. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he never sought 
to free himself from it" (92). The life of the young Parisian is a fictional realization of the 
theories that Lord Henry presents to Dorian at the beginning of Dorian Gray, and the 
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book ' s influence is an extension of Henry 's . It is the chief force governing Dorian 's 
behaviour from shortly after the death of Sibyl Vane until the end of the novel. 
After Henry introduces him to the book, Dorian immediately begins to identify 
himself with its central character. According to the narrator, "The hero, the wonderful 
young Parisian . . . became to him a kind of prefiguring type of himself. And, indeed, the 
whole book seemed to h im to contain the story of his own life, written before he had 
lived i t" (93). Thus, Dorian sets out to actualize this compelling fictional paradigm of 
existence, and he embraces as his own the young Parisian's quest to attain the most 
varied experience of life possible: 
[H]e would often adopt certain modes of thought that he knew to be really alien to 
his nature, abandon himself to their subtle influences, and then, having, as it were, 
caught their colour and satisfied his intellectual curiosity, leave them with that 
curious indifference that is not incompatible with a real ardour of temperament . . . . 
(96) 
In his search for diverse perspectives on the world, Dorian flirts with models of 
belief ranging from Roman Catholicism to Mysticism to Darwinism, but, we are told, "he 
never [falls] into the error of arresting his intellectual development by any formal 
acceptance of creed or system" (97). Ultimately, therefore, the philosophy that he has 
acquired from the poisonous book is founded on a rejection of the notion that truth exists 
in any absolute or enduring sense. According to this philosophy, the identity of an 
individual is also a composite and nebulous quantity: 
[Dorian] used to wonder at the shallow psychology of those who conceive the 
Ego in man as a thing simple, permanent, reliable, and of one essence. To him, 
man was a being with myriad lives and myriad sensations, a complex multiform 
creature that bore within itself strange legacies of thought and pass ion . . . . (104) 
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Given this belief in the multiplicity of all things, Dorian 's borrowed program of 
experiential promiscuity involves no regard for conventional morality, which is 
predicated on the idea that there are fixed and objective standards of right and wrong. He 
therefore engages in countless unspecified criminal activities (many of which, it is hinted, 
involve a strong element of sexual perversion), and when Basil Hallward comes to warn 
him that people are speaking of him "as something vile and degraded" (109), Dorian 
shows him the grotesque state of the once-beautiful portrait and then stabs him to death. 
Eventually, reality reasserts itself as an incontrovertible element in Dorian 's 
artificial life. This avenging force initially takes the form of Sibyl 's brother. James Vane, 
a sailor who is the very embodiment of artless plebeianism. Born to an actress, he 
"hatefs] his mother ' s affectations" (47) and "detestfs] scenes of every kind" (51), and he 
is therefore a most appropriate agent for the punishment of aesthetically motivated 
crimes. Happening across Dorian eighteen years after his sister 's death, James determines 
to kill him: however, he himself is killed in a chance accident, and justice is miscarried. 
After his brush with death, Dorian resolves to change his ways, but the resolution comes 
too late. As an experiment, he performs a good deed and runs to see if doing so has 
relieved his portrait of some of its hideousness, but the only effect is that the picture 
sports a new hint of cunning and hypocrisy (163). Contemplating this development, 
Dorian reflects that the portrait "ha[s] been conscience" (164) to him. and he decides to 
destroy it. The result of this action is his own death. This harsh conclusion to his career of 
atheism implies that, to use Dorian's own rueful words, "The soul is a terrible reality" 
(158)—and that definite categories of good and evil do exist, after all. 
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Shortly before his final, fatal encounter with his portrait-conscience, Dorian says 
to Lord Henry, "you poisoned me with a book once. I should not forgive that. Harry, 
promise me that you will never lend that book to any one. It does harm" (160). Thus, it is 
made clear that Dorian 's downfall is directly linked to his enactment of a literary 
prototype. His emulation of the young Parisian illustrates Wilde ' s argument that life 
imitates art in the sense that "one ha[s] ancestors in literature, as well as in one ' s own 
race, nearer perhaps in type and temperament, many of them, and certainly with an 
influence of which one [is] more absolutely conscious"(/X7 105). On the surface, Dorian 
Gray's picture of a reader becoming captivated by a fictional role is reminiscent of the 
quixote theme examined in the first chapter of this thesis. However, the influence that the 
poisonous book exerts over Dorian is fundamentally different from that experienced by 
the heroines of the female quixote novels, because it lacks the element of delusion. 
Unlike the quixote figures, whose application of fictional conventions to their own lives 
results from a literal inability to tell fiction from reality. Dorian consciously gives in to 
the impulse to pattern his life after a fictional model because it fascinates him. He views 
the young Parisian as an appealing formal type and imitates his behaviour as an aesthetic 
experiment. In short, he imitates him because he recognizes that this hero is a work of art. 
not due to a failure to recognize the fact. 
The matter of the poisonous book plants yet another paradox in the way of 
unravelling the tangled relationship between Dorian Gray and Wilde ' s other writings. 
Though both the content of the book and Dorian 's imitative appropriation of its precepts 
appear to be in perfect accordance with many of the principles that Wilde expounds in the 
dialogues, the book is repeatedly described as a poisonous and evil force that helps to 
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drive Dorian to his horrific end. Because Lord Henry is responsible for giving the book to 
Dorian, its poisonous nature also emphasizes his problematic dual role as Wilde-figure 
and devil incarnate. Together with the tragic outcome of the Sibyl Vane episode, the 
destructive nature of the poisonous book, and the evil associations of the novel ' s resident 
aesthetic theorist, Dor ian 's final demise seems to undermine many of the ideas that Wilde 
himself stands for. Towards the end of the novel, Henry says to Dorian. "Life has been 
your art. You have set yourself to music. Your days are your sonnets" (160). Indeed. 
Dorian 's life has been devoted to that pursuit of art and artifice so enthusiastically 
prescribed by Wilde ' s criticism, but he is ultimately faced with the (reality of the) reality 
that he has sought to deny. 
Thus, Dorian Gray does have a moral, and to all appearances it is a moral that 
flies in the face of many ideas that Wilde advances in his crit icism—including the oft-
repeated argument that "The sphere of art and the sphere of ethics are absolutely distinct 
and separate" (Letter to the editor of the St. James's Gazette, 25 June 1890. 237). There 
are several possible ways of coming to terms with this contradiction, though most of 
them offer only a partial or imperfect explanation of Wilde 's purpose in arranging his 
novel as he has. 
In a letter to the editor of the St. James's Gazette, Wilde himself admits that 
"there is a terrible moral in Dorian Gray' (26 June 1890. 240): he goes on to write, "Is 
this an artistic error? I fear it is. It is the only error in the book" (241). One reason why he 
has allowed himself to fall into this "artistic error" is suggested by further comments on 
the subject in his correspondence, where he says, "When I first conceived the idea of a 
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young man selling his soul in exchange for eternal youth . . . I felt that, from an aesthetic 
point of view, it would be difficult to keep the moral in its proper secondary p lace" 
(Letter to the editor of the Daily Chronicle 245). The moral element is here treated as 
something fundamental to the literary paradigm that Wilde has chosen to adapt: it is thus 
inherited by Dorian Gray as an integral part of the Faust legend, rather than being 
actively introduced by Wilde himself. While this idea may account for the existence of a 
moral in the story, however, it does not satisfactorily explain why Wilde has seen fit to 
achieve this moral by means of trampling his own critical views. W h y are Dorian 's 
transgressions made to spring so directly from his adherence to such Wildean 
philosophies as those that are spouted by Lord Henry and contained in the poisonous 
book? 
Perhaps the answer may be found in the way that these theories are implemented 
by Dorian—or rather, in the very fact that they are implemented. It could be that his fatal 
flaw is not his choice of philosophy, but the literalness with which he enacts it. W e are 
told that "no theory of life seem[s] to him to be of any importance compared with life 
itself," for "He [feels] keenly conscious of how barren all intellectual speculation is when 
separated from action and experiment" (DG 97). As a result of this need to translate 
theories out of the intellectual realm into that of lived experience. Dorian may be one of 
those whom Vivian derides as "the tedious people who carry out their principles to the 
bitter end of action, to the reductio ad absurdum of practice" ("D of L" 778). Where Lord 
Henry, as we have seen, restricts the expression of his amoral proclivities entirely to the 
verbal and theoretical sphere, Dorian puts them into effect in the real world. At one point, 
he declares of one of Henry 's flippant aphorisms about love and marriage, "I am putting 
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it into practice, as I do everything that you say" (34), and this statement tidily 
summarizes the failing for which, perhaps, Wilde ultimately punishes him: his inability to 
be content with drawing experience from art alone. This argument is supported by 
evidence found in Wi lde ' s other writings, where the idea that art, rather than life, is the 
proper, sterile arena for experiencing various sensations and emotions crops up several 
times. In "The Critic as Artist," for instance, Gilbert argues explicitly that "nothing that 
one can imagine is worth doing, and . . . one can imagine everything" (851). W e must go 
to art for everything, he says, because life "makes us pay too high a price for its wares, 
and we purchase the meanest of its secrets at a cost that is monstrous and infinite" (851). 
Elsewhere, in his own voice. Wilde also states, "It is proper that limitations should be 
placed on action. It is not proper that limitations should be placed on art" (Letter to the 
editor of the St. James's Gazette, 27 June 1890, 243). 
Dorian 's literal enactment of Lord Henry 's artfully drawn theories may also 
constitute a transgression against Wilde ' s idea of the importance of individualism, and 
this idea is inherent in Dorian Gray itself. Early in the novel, Henry ironically informs 
Dorian, 
There is no such thing as a good influence. Mr. Gray. All influence is immoral— 
immoral from the scientific point of v iew. . . . [T]o influence a person is to give 
him one 's own soul. He does not think his natural thoughts, or burn with his 
natural pass ions . . . . He becomes an echo of some one else 's music , an actor of a 
part that has not been written for him. The aim of life is self-development. To 
realize one 's nature perfectly—that is what each of us is here for. (13) 
In the context of this passage. Dorian 's story can be read, not as that of an individual 's 
self-realization in the face of society's artificial mores, but as the chronicle of his 
obliteration by a more powerful personality. There is no doubt that he becomes the 
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receptacle for his mentor ' s every thought, and Lord Henry is diabolically conscious of the 
fact. At one point he reflects, 
There was something terribly enthralling in the exercise of influence. N o other 
activity was like it. To project one 's soul into some gracious form, and let it tarry 
there for a moment: to hear one 's own intellectual views echoed back to one with 
all the added music of passion and youth; to convey one 's temperament into 
another as though it were a subtle fluid or a strange perfume: there was a real joy-
in that . . . . (26) 
However, the notion that the uninfluenced development of an individual 's "natural 
thoughts ' ' and "natural passions" is part of life's ultimate purpose appears itself to be 
strongly at odds with Wilde ' s professed disdain for nature and penchant towards art and 
artifice of every kind. 
Thus, it seems that the inconsistencies presented by Dorian Gray might be best 
understood as evidence of its author 's stance on the legitimacy of paradox and 
inconsistency in all artistic and critical endeavours. The prevalence of this theme in 
Wilde ' s criticism has already been discussed at some length earlier in this chapter; it 
surfaces again in Dorian Gray, concisely expressed by a minor character who attends the 
luncheon where Lord Henry shows off his virtuosity at proving the patently absurd. Mr. 
Erskine of Treadley, described as a quiet "old gentleman of considerable charm and 
culture" (27), responds to Henry's performance by saying, "the way of paradoxes is the 
way of truth. To test Reality we must see it on the tight-rope. When the Verities become 
acrobats w e can judge them" (29). Treadley 's summation may be the most appropriate 
tagline not only for the conflicted relationship between Dorian Gray and the dialogues, 
but for Oscar Wilde ' s own existence. 
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Wilde did not merely theorize that life should be a work of art, in which beauty 
and creativity are the only measures of value and all truths are relative. He also behaved 
as though this were the case, inventing himself as the supreme embodiment of affectation 
and whimsy. However, his affection for posing and contemptuous dismissal of moral 
standards did not go over well with a number of his contemporaries; the world does not 
gladly tolerate one who denies the ambient beliefs of his t ime. Ultimately, as Bruce B. 
Clark suggests, "the philosophy that poisoned Dorian ... destroyed Wilde a l so" (247), 
both as it was lived and as it was expressed on paper. With their unapologetic rejection of 
conventional truths, Wi lde ' s irreverent compositions served as evidence for the 
prosecution in his trial for gross indecency—the outcome of which sealed his well-known 
and tragic fate. 
110 
V. Conclus ion 
Mere words! Was there anything so real as words? 
-Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray 
The rhetorical question that I have appropriated for the epigraph to m y conclusion 
provides a tidy—albeit decidedly oversimplified—summary of the issue binding together 
the various fictions that have been examined in the foregoing pages. The thread 
connecting these works is their intense thematic concern with the nature of fiction itself: 
its conventions, its value, and. most importantly, how it relates (or should relate) to 
reality. Frequently, the authors of these texts have invested them with implications about 
the production and consumption of fiction that extend beyond the realm of literature to 
address the dichotomy between truth and untruth more generally. 
The didactic quixote novels discussed in the first chapter demonstrate a concern 
with the effect of fiction on readers ' perception of reality; this concern is chiefly 
moralistic in its motivation. Emerging in response to the proliferation of popular romantic 
and sentimental fiction in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the "female 
quixote'" theme reflects the anxiety that impressionable readers might lose sight of the 
fictionality of fiction and attempt to apply its romantic precepts to their own lives. The 
chief threat perceived in this possibility was that women ' s virtue might be compromised 
through their rejection of the model of companionate love and marriage that was 
endorsed by society as one of the world 's incontrovertible realities. Thus, the quixotic 
"heroines" of writers such as Tabitha Oilman Tenney, Charlotte Dacre, and Sarah Green 
are brought by their romantic credulity to suffer misery and degradation: they are 
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emblems of the moral danger attendant on the confusion of fiction and reality, or lies and 
truth. 
In their more comedic renditions of the quixote theme, Eaton Stannard Barrett and 
Jane Austen also emphasize the disparity between reality and the conventions of 
romance, but their interest in the subject is more artistically than morally motivated. 
Rather than extending to their readers a warning about the dangers posed to life by the 
uncritical consumption of fiction, Barrett and Austen offer textually self-conscious 
interpretations of the quixote paradigm that underscore the negative effects of absurd 
romantic excesses on the quality and status of fiction itself. 
As one of the major realist authors of the mid-century, Will iam Thackeray is 
similarly concerned with promoting realism in fiction for fiction's own sake, rather than 
for moralistic reasons. Where the didactic quixote novelists caution their readers against 
attempting to apply fictional models of the world to lived reality. Thackeray attempts to 
deter his readers from approaching fiction itself with an uncritically accepting attitude 
towards fictional convention. His own realistic novels arc therefore interspersed with 
episodes of commentary designed to draw attention to the relative verisimilitude of his 
own writing, as well as to point out the places where it lapses unavoidably into the realm 
of the improbable. Thackeray 's enthusiasm for realism in fiction is an extension of his 
love of truth in life; while his literary-critical interludes demonstrate his distaste for 
fiction of an overly fantastic cast, the content of his novels broadcasts his coincident 
disgust with the artificiality that he perceives in the society he christens "Vanity Fair.'* 
Thus, the didactic female quixote novelists deride unrealistic fiction for its 
potentially destructive influence on readers ' lives, and Thackeray, an advocate of truth in 
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any context, criticizes its low standard of credibility from an aesthetic standpoint. In 
contrast, Oscar Wilde ' s discussions of the relationship between fiction and reality 
valorize imaginative fictions as being more aesthetically satisfying, and therefore better, 
than realistic fictions. His perspective therefore represents a complete reversal of those 
discussed in the first two chapters, which range from belittling fiction entirely to valuing 
it only insofar as it resembles reality or propounds accepted truths. Wi lde ' s championing 
of artifice and the unnatural extends beyond a simple rejection of realism in fiction, 
representing also his stance on life beyond literature and the traditional arts: he argues 
that life is given beauty and significance through the imposition of artifice. What is more, 
rather than trying to divorce his concept of fiction from any negative associations with 
lying and posturing, he explicitly endorses these forms of fabrication as means of 
introducing creativity and invention into daily life. By suggesting that life is itself an art 
form, and that such socially accepted "realities" as religions and systems of morality are 
made up of arbitrary beliefs that come and go with the tides of fashion, Wilde questions 
the very categories of truth and fiction that underpin the arguments of the earlier writers. 
His theories regarding the nebulous nature of truth are played out in the contradictory 
relationships that exist among many of his own writings. 
As we have seen, the writings of nineteenth-century novelists offer a variety of 
implicit responses to the question that heads this chapter. These range from the didactic 
quixote novelists" emphatic insistence that mere words must never be mistaken for 
reality: to Thackeray 's belief that words must aspire, however unsuccessfully, to 
approximate the real as best they can: to Wilde ' s view that the only important reality is 
constituted by the cleverest words being spoken or written at a given moment . Whether it 
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was conceived in moral or aesthetic terms, the fiction-reality divide thus provided a rich 
vein of matter to the pens of the contrivers of nineteenth-century fiction. 
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